Can\u27t Live Without Air: Title Insurance and the Bursting of the Real Estate Bubble by Bagwell, Marvin N.
Pace Law Review 
Volume 30 
Issue 1 Fall 2009 
Real Property, Mortgages, and the Economy: A 
Call for Ethics and Reforms 
Article 18 
September 2009 
Can't Live Without Air: Title Insurance and the Bursting of the Real 
Estate Bubble 
Marvin N. Bagwell 
Bagwell & Associates Title Agency LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marvin N. Bagwell, Can't Live Without Air: Title Insurance and the Bursting of the Real Estate 
Bubble, 30 Pace L. Rev. 180 (2009) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
 
 
180 
UNSETTLING MORTGAGE LAW: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRACTITIONERS AND TITLE 
INSURERS 
 
 
&DQ·W/LYH:LWKRXW$LU 
Title Insurance and the Bursting 
of the Real Estate Bubble 
 
Marvin N. Bagwell* 
 
´&DQ·WOLYHFDQ·WEUHDWKHZLWKQRDLUµ1 
 
I. Prologue 
 
A few months ago, I wrote a brief article originally titled ´A 
Fairy Tale,µ which ended up being published in The Bulletin, 
The Journal of the New York State Land Title Association³a 
title industry publication.  Several people who read the article 
prior to its publication advised me against releasing it to the 
public.  The pre-­publication readers were hesitant because I 
made a startling admission in the article: that people in the 
title industry knew that the real estate bubble was about to 
burst.2  Their concern was that my admission could be used 
 
* Marvin N. Bagwell is the President and Founder of Bagwell & 
Associates Title Agency LLC, which has offices in New York City and in 
White Plains, New York.  Formerly, he was the Vice-­President and Eastern 
Divisional Counsel for United General Title Insurance Company.  Mr. 
Bagwell has served as President of both the New York State Land Title 
Association and the Title Industry Rate Service Association.  Mr. Bagwell is a 
member of the Executive Board of the New York State Bar Real Property 
Section and is a Co-­(GLWRURIWKH6HFWLRQ·V-RXUQDO+HLVWKHDXWKRURIRYHU
70 published articles on real estate and title insurance law, and most recently 
HGLWHG WKH7LWOH ,QVXUDQFH6HFWLRQ RI:DUUHQ·V:HHG ,Q 0U%DJZHOO
was elected a Fellow of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers. 
1. JORDIN SPARKS DUET WITH CHRIS BROWN, NO AIR (Jive Records 2007). 
2. Marvin N. Bagwell, :HDYLQJ D 7DOH RI :RH IURP 7RGD\·V (FRQRPLF
Crisis ² Can this Possibly Be True? Is this a Fairy Tale?, BULL.: J. N.Y. STATE 
LAND TITLE ASS·N, Summer 2008, at 3. 
1
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against the entire industry in a court of law or, more 
importantly, in the court of public opinion. 
Under the system that we employ to conduct real estate 
closings or settlements in New York, with all parties sitting 
around a closing table, a title company representative is 
present at every closing from the smallest residential re-­
finance to a multi-­million dollar acquisition and mortgaging of 
a Manhattan skyscraper.  After the closing, title closers would 
often return to their offices, wondering how in the world the 
borrowers were going to afford their mortgage.  How could a 
security guard clearing $35,000 annually afford a half-­million 
dollar mortgage?  Was the GM building really worth a billion 
and a half dollars?  The time came when title people would 
wager on how long it would take the borrower to go into 
IRUHFORVXUH DIWHU WKH FORVLQJ GDWH  ´+H ZRQ·W PDNH WKH ILUVW
payment.  I bet we will receive an order for a foreclosure search 
on this property within ninety days.  Where are the lenders 
REWDLQLQJWKHPRQH\WRPDNHDOORIWKHVHVWXSLGORDQV"µ7KRVH
of us in the title industry knew that something was up, but we 
did not know exactly what was going on.  As it turns out, we 
were right³the bubble was about to burst, but we did not 
know as much as we had thought, nor did we fully know 
exactly when or why.  In any event, had we known and issued 
warnings to raise red flags, we would have been ignored.  
Forces much greater than any title closer, or even title 
company, were at work.  Warnings would have been ignored 
and we know what happens to the messenger. 
Yes, the intent of this Article is to apply some salve to the 
conscience of title personnel everywhere by describing (at 
probably too great a length) exactly what forces had been 
unleashed in the economy that led to the creation and, 
eventually, to the bursting of the real estate bubble.  The 
bursting of the real estate bubble, which many experts think 
OHG WR WKH FXUUHQW ILQDQFLDO FULVLVZDVQRW WKH WLWOH LQGXVWU\·V
fault, but rather, the blame lies with us all. 
The history of the bursting of the real estate bubble in 
2007 is still being written.  Many of the sources cited in this 
Article are from newspapers, especially the papers of record, 
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.  Since we are 
still in the midst of the financial crises, definitive studies and 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18
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books are still being written.  To describe what happened, and 
what is happening, we will work with what we have. 
 
II. Introduction 
 
It is axiomatic;; bubbles require air.  Without air, bubbles, 
like the pop version of teenage love, could not exist.  Indeed a 
bubble is mostly air.  One way to define a bubble is as a globule 
of liquid inflated with air or gas.  When the pressure of the 
liquid or air within the bubble becomes too much for the 
JOREXOH·V VNLQ WKH EXEEOH ZLOO EXUVW  (FRQRPLFDOO\ ZH DUH
OLYLQJ LQ WKH DIWHUPDWK RI WKH UHDO HVWDWH EXEEOH·V EXUVWLQJ
This is certainly not the first time that an economy was 
brought low by the bursting of a bubble.  Most historical 
GLVFXVVLRQV RI HFRQRPLF EXEEOHV EXUVWLQJ VWDUWZLWK+ROODQG·V
tulip mania of the eighteenth century, then move on to 
(QJODQG·V HQFRXQWHU ZLWK WKH 6RXWK 6HDV EXEEOH RI WKH
nineteenth century and the American railroad bond bubble of 
the nineteenth century, followed by the mother of all bubbles, 
the 1929 stock market crash, which led to the Great Depression 
of the twentieth century.  The commonality of each bubble is 
that each left economic and financial devastation in its wake. 
The purpose of this Article is not to propose a solution to 
prevent bubbles from occurring so as to prevent the havoc 
caused by their bursting, but to describe what exactly 
contributed to the air that inflated the real estate bubble and 
which led to its inevitable bursting.  For those of you expecting 
charts and references to government studies and Ph.D 
dissertations, please prepare to be disappointed.  Those of us in 
the title industry are a simple lot.  Our primary references will 
be the press reports, the anachronistic printed word.  
Hopefully, the flavor of what happened will not be lost on too 
many. 
Our discussion to coPH ZLOO IRFXV RQ IRXU ´DWLRQVµ 
VHFXULWL]DWLRQJOREDOL]DWLRQVSHFXODWLRQUHJXODWLRQRQH´LVPµ 
consumerism;; and one word that speaks for itself: fraud.  Here 
is a warning to the reader: things will not be, as Tina Turner 
ZDVNQRZQWRKRSHIRU´QLFHDQGHDV\µ7KHUHZLOOEHRYHUODS
Economic collapses in the real world are messy.  Benjamin 
)UDQNOLQ RQFH FRPPHQWHG ´VXFFHVV KDV PDQ\ SDUHQWV EXW
3
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failurHLVDQRUSKDQµ2XUJRDOLQLGHQWLI\LQJWKHVRXUFHVRIWKH
air that inflated the bubble, and that led to its inevitable 
bursting, is to empty out the orphanage. 
 
III. Securitization 
 
Air is comprised of many chemical components, some of 
which are conducive to life, such as oxygen, nitrogen, and 
carbon dioxide;; and others that may lead to the extinction of 
humanity, such as carbon monoxide, ozone, and chlorides.  
Securitization started out as providing life-­giving oxygen to the 
financial system, but over the course of three decades evolved 
into pumping life-­depriving ozone into the system instead. 
Securitization works in the following way.  We can start 
with one set of homebuyers.  In order to finance the purchase of 
their home, the homebuyers take out a loan.  The obligation to 
repay the loan is represented by a note.  The note, in turn, is 
secured by a mortgage on the home.  In the 1970s, Lew Ranieri, 
then a prominent bond trader at the Wall Street firm Salomon 
Brothers,3 developed the process of taking hundreds and 
thousands of mortgages and pooling or packaging the 
mortgages into bonds.  The bonds were then sold to 
institutional investors.  This process had the benefit of taking 
the mortgages off the hands and the books of the local lender 
and putting them into the hands of investors who could be 
located anywhere.  The local bank sold the mortgage to 
investors who, in turn, paid for the bond, thereby providing the 
bank with funds to make more mortgage loans.  Everyone 
involved in the process, from the local bank to the investor, and 
especially the Wall Street middlemen who packaged the 
mortgages into bonds and who then sold the bonds to the 
investor, made money.4 
The rules of evolution govern on Wall Street as well.  
 
3. The tale of Salomon Brothers·V rise and fall is immortalized in 
0LFKDHO/HZLV·VERRNLIAR·S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL 
STREET (1989).  As in the case of many financial immortals, Salomon no 
longer exists as an independent entity. It is buried somewhere within 
Citigroup, which, by the time this Article is read, may no longer exist as a 
private financial company either. 
4. See Nancy Gibbs, 25 People to Blame, TIME, Feb. 22, 2009, at 20, 25 
(describing Mr. Ranieri and the process). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18
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Relatively simple financial tools evolve into more complex 
machinery.  Mortgage-­backed securities or bonds in turn were 
grouped into packages of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
´&02Vµ RU &ROODWHUDOL]HG 'HEW 2EOLJDWLRQV ´&'2Vµ5  
Therefore, investors had the opportunity to purchase a debt 
instrument such as a CDO for which the underlying source of 
payment was not one mortgage, but several thousand of them.  
In fact, the underlying obligation of a CDO might not be 
individual mortgages, but bonds secured by individual 
mortgages.6  And of course, CDOs grew in terms of complexity 
and intricacy.  Any type of debt that a consumer or corporation 
owed, from automobile loans to credit card debt to multi-­billion 
dollar commercial lease financing, were turned into CDOs.  
Even Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal 
5HVHUYH VDLGWKDW&'2VZHUH´EHZLOGHULQJµ7  It was thought 
that such obligations carried little risk because, while one 
mortgage might go into foreclosure, it would not taint the 
entire pool.  This turned out not to be the case because, as the 
financial crisis deepened, larger and larger percentages of the 
PRUWJDJHVLQWKHSRROVEHJDQWRJR´EDGµRUJRLQWRGHIDXOW)RU
example, in one series of mortgage-­backed securities sold by 
Bank of America in 2007, 16% of the loans in the pool were 
sixty or more days overdue.8  In 2007, Citigroup issued a 
mortgage-­backed security in which 31% of the underlying loans 
were sixty or more days delinquent.9  Of course, the higher the 
delinquency rate, the less likely the return on the security will 
turn out as initially predicted, and the more likely the 
 
5. Drexel Burnham Lambert issued the first CDO in 1987 for Imperial 
Savings Association. Gregory Cresci, Merrill, Citigroup Record CDO Fees 
Earned in Top Growth Market, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 30, 2005, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=a.FcDwf1.ZG4&ref
er=us.  Drexel later went defunct and its most famous broker, junk bond king 
Michael Milken, went off to prison in 1988 for racketeering and securities 
fraud.  Alison Leigh Cowan, Milken to Pay $500 Million More In $1.3 Billion 
Drexel Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at A1. 
6. See Stephen Gandel, One Bad Bond, TIME, Mar. 9, 2009, at 30 
(providing an excellent description of the process, from home mortgages to 
bonds and more). 
7. Alessandra Stanley, Economists Try Target Practice in a Fun-­House 
Mirror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at C1. 
8. James R. Hagerty & Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Feels Bite of Move into 
Mortgage-­Backed Securities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2009, at C8. 
9. Id. 
5
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VHFXULW\·V KROGHU ZLOO LQFXU D ORVV  $OVR DV RQH FDQ VHH WKH
financial instruments are moving further away from the 
traditional one mortgage for one homeowner system.  In the 
SURFHVV KRPHRZQHUV· Dllegiances to their local lenders and 
willingness to stretch themselves to make the payments when 
under economic duress becomes tenuous at best.10 
How big of a problem will losses from securitization 
EHFRPH"  1R RQH NQRZV IRU VXUH EXW ´>D@FFRUGLQJ WR ,QVLGe 
Mortgage Finance, some eight million nonprime mortgages 
were put into securities pools in 2005 and 2006 and sold to 
investors.  The value of these loans was $797 billion in 2005 
DQGELOOLRQLQµ11 
To complicate matters further, and partially to protect 
investors from losing money if that one mortgage went into 
default, Wall Street began to slice and dice the mortgage pools 
LQWR ´WUDQFKHVµ  7KH WUDQFKHV DUH VOLFHV RI WKH VDPH SRRO RI
mortgages divided into parts based on the probability that the 
mortgages will be paid and not go into foreclosure.  The highest 
rated mortgages, those that were least likely to go into 
foreclosure, would be sold to investors at the lowest interest 
rate because the risk of default was the smallest.  Conversely, 
those mortgages with the highest probability of default were 
sold at the highest interest rates to account for the risk that 
the homeowners might default and go into foreclosure.  Wall 
Street also created tranches from the interest due on the 
mortgage or from the principal.12  The types, numbers, and 
parts of mortgages divided into tranches, and indeed the 
process itself, became so dizzying that it became entirely 
conceivable that several investors might own identical or 
different parts of the same mortgage.13  As we will soon see, for 
 
10. $FFRUGLQJWRVRPHZKHQDSHUVRQ·V LQFRPHEHFRPHVVWUHVVHGKHRU
VKH LV OHVVLQFOLQHGWR´VWLFN-­it-­RXWµZLWKKLVRUKHU OHQGHU LI WKDW OHQGHUKDV
become a faceless international concern as opposed to his or her local banker.  
See Walter Kirn, My Debt, Their Asset, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, § 6 
(Magazine), at 26. 
11. Gretchen Morgenson, Guess What Got Lost in the Loan Pool, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at BU1. 
12. See generally Floyd Norris, In Turnabout, Thain Caved In, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at C1;; Anise Wallace, Market Place;; Making 'Junk 
Bonds' Respectable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1989, at D1. 
13. See Lingling Wei & Alex Frangos, +DQFRFN DW &HQWHU RI ¶7UDQFKH
:DUIDUH·, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2009, at C1 (describing the havoc now on the 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18
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those investors, the complexity of CMOs, CDOs, and the 
tranches they inspired would make the foreclosure process 
even more of a nightmare. 
It takes more than debt for securitization to work.  Other 
actors are required.  First, investors want to know that the 
debt will be repaid.  The credit rating agencies, particularly 
0RRG\·V,QYHVWRU·V6HUYLFH6WDQGDUG	3RRU·VDQGWRD OHVVHU
extent, Fitch Ratings Services, evolved to provide this service.  
Indeed, they were basically empowered by federal law as the 
only entities that were allowed to rate securities.14  Their job 
was to independently assess the ability of borrowers to repay 
their loans and to report that ability to lenders in the form of 
UDWLQJVJHQHUDOO\IURP´$$$µRU´7ULSOH$µbasically meaning 
WKDWWKHGHEWZRXOGEHUHSDLGWR´&µZKLFKWUDQVODWHGWRMXQN
status where repayment would be problematic.  Even parts of 
CDOs, such as the tranches discussed above, could be rated.  Of 
course, the better or higher the rating, the lower the 
corresponding interest rate.15 
Unfortunately, it developed that the rating agencies were 
to become victims of a built-­in conflict of interest.  The sellers 
of the securities paid the rating agencies to rate the securities 
the sellers would offer to the public.  The question became: to 
whom did the rating agencies owe their allegiance³to the 
public or to the Wall Street firms that paid the rating agencies 
WKHLU IHHV DQG DGGHG WR WKH DJHQFLHV· HYHU-­increasing profit 
coffers?  In the aftermath of the bursting of the real estate 
bubble, the conclusion reached by the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform was that the Wall Street 
security sellers benefitted from the conflict of interest.  As for 
the public and investors, the performance of the rating 
agencies was D ´FRORVVDO IDLOXUHµ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH +RXVH
6XEFRPPLWWHH·V FKDLUPDQ +HQU\ :D[PDQ16  However, the 
PRVW VHDULQJ LQGLFWPHQW RI WKH UDWLQJ DJHQFLHV· SHUIRUPDQFH
came from one of their own.  In an internal e-­mail, a Standard 
 
legal horizon which was ignited by the use of tranches);; Gandel, supra note 6.  
14. See James Surowiecki, Ratings Downgrade, NEW YORKER, Sept. 28, 
2009, at 25. 
15. Id. 
16. Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by 
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B1;; Gretchen Morgenson, Debt 
Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A1. 
7
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	3RRU·V DQDO\VWZURWH WKDW ´>D ERQG@ FRXOG EH VWUXFWXUHG E\
FRZVDQGZHZRXOGUDWHLWµ17  No wonder Time magazine chose 
.DWKOHHQ&RUEHWZKRUDQ6WDQGDUG	3RRU·VWKHODUJHVWUDWLQJ
agency, as one of the twenty-­five people to blame for the 
financial meltdown.18 
Bond insurance companies, principally Mortgage 
*XDUDQWHH ,QVXUDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´0*,&µ DQG $PEDF
$VVXUDQFH ´$PEDFµ ZHUH WKH VHFRQG DFWRUV  )RU GHFDGHV
these companies labored in the plain vanilla vineyard of 
insuring municipal bonds issued by governmental borrowers.19  
The business provided a steady but reasonable income, 
primarily because claims were rare and far between.  Orange 
&RXQW\&DOLIRUQLD·V EDQNUXSWF\ LQ SURYHG WKH H[FHSWLRQ
and simultaneously served to promote the necessity for bond 
insurance.20  However, in the drive for more profits, both MGIC 
and Ambac began to insure more exotic indentures such as 
CMOs and CDOs.21  The fact that MGIC or Ambac insured the 
bond issues, thereby saying that if the issuer defaulted and did 
not make payments when due, the insurance companies would 
do so, made it easier for Wall Street to sell the securities to the 
public.  However, as early as 2006, CDO losses began to raise 
FRQFHUQV RQ:DOO 6WUHHW LURQLFDOO\ DERXW0*,& DQG $PEDF·V
own solvency³that is, their own ability to pay if their insured 
bond issuers defaulted.  By late 2007, MGIC and Ambac were 
in real distress and their survival was in question.22  It took a 
major investment offer by Warren Buffet, billions in 
recapitalization, and the intervention of the New York State 
Insurance Department to steady the bond insurers.23  The bond 
 
17. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 23. 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-­Ed, The End of the 
Financial World As We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, WK 9. 
20. Michael Quint, 2UDQJH &RXQW\·V 'HEDFOH &RXOG 3URYH D %RRQ IRU
Bond Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at D6. 
21. See Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 19. 
22. Vikas Bajaj, Two Bond Insurers End the Week Severely Weakened, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at C2. 
23. Vikas Bajaj, Buffett Offers to Reinsure Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/12cnd-­
buffett.html;; Karen Richardson & Damian Paletta, Spitzer Warns Bond 
Insurers;; Governor Says Firms have 3 to 5 Days to Raise Capital, WALL ST. J., 
)HE   DW $ 3UHVV 5HOHDVH 1< 6WDWH ,QV 'HS·W 'HSDUWPHQW
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18
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insurance companies, by enabling securitization, had become 
one of its victims.24  As of this date, the companies are still not 
RXWRIWKHZRRGV0RRG\·VUHFHQWO\FXW0*,&·VFUHGLW rating to 
junk status.25 
If the borrowers and sellers of CDOs could buy insurance 
plans to ensure the lenders that they would be paid, why not 
offer those lenders their own opportunities to buy insurance to 
ensure that the borrowers would pay them?  This essentially 
defines a credit default swap.  To use AIG as an example, a 
company may sell insurance to lenders, providing them with 
protection in the event that a borrower does not make 
payments under a CDO or CMO when due.  AIG will then 
make the payments in the event that the borrower defaults.  In 
effect, AIG swaps its Triple A credit rating for that of the 
borrower if the borrower defaults.  Theoretically, this is great 
business, until borrowers begin to default. 
In September 2008, it became obvious to the Treasury 
Department that homeowners, by the millions, were beginning 
to default on their mortgage payments.26  The credit markets 
also began to take notice that the mortgage insurers, Ambac 
and MGIC, did not have the capital to pay all of the losses.27  
They were in trouble themselves.  The markets noted that AIG, 
which had insured trillions of dollars of CDOs and CMOs, only 
had billions in capital to pay the losses.28  If AIG collapsed, 
lenders throughout the world, including sovereign governments 
and lenders to the United States such as China, Japan, Saudi 
Arabia, and South Korea, all of whom held billions in U.S. debt, 
would have to immediately recognize trillions of dollars of 
loses.29  The situation was untenable.  If it were to occur, the 
 
Facilitates, Supervises MBIA Split;; Should Add Capacity to Municipal Bond 
Insurance Market (Feb. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2009/p0902181.htm. 
24. Mark Landler & David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Swarm the 
Treasury For a Helping of the Bailout Pie, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A22. 
25. Kathy Shwiff, &ULVLV RQ :DOO 6WUHHW 0RRG\·V 6ODVKHV 5DWLQJV RQ
Mortgage Insurers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at C3. 
26. See Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 19. 
27. See id.  
28. Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams 
Walsh, )HG·V%LOOLRQ/RDQ5HVFXHV,QVXUHU, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at 
A1. 
29. Id. 
9
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Federal NationaO0RUWJDJH$VVRFLDWLRQ´)DQQLH0DHµDQGWKH
)HGHUDO +RPH /RDQ 0RUWJDJH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´)UHGGLH 0DFµ
(more on them later) might default on their debt and bring the 
world economy to its knees.  To prevent that from happening, 
the Treasury Department bailed out AIG to the tune (to date) 
of $150 billion dollars.30  This may not be sufficient.  Both the 
Wall Street Journal and the New York Times have reported 
that AIG will report a $60 billion loss for the fourth quarter of 
2008.31  If AIG is unable to obtain the capital to cover the losses 
and is forced into bankruptcy, the domino effect would be 
KRUUHQGRXV  2WKHU OHQGHUV ZKR KROG $,*·V FUHGLW VZDSV DV
insurance against the losses in their portfolio would have to 
take the losses on their own books, thereby eroding their own 
capital base and possibly leading to their failure as well.32  In 
effect, an AIG failure could bring down many other institutions 
with it.  This explains why the Treasury advanced funds to AIG 
so quickly in late 2008 and may have to do more of the same in 
2009.33 
Contrary to the explanations offered to the public, the 
advanced funds to AIG were meant to benefit the American 
public only secondarily, if at all.  The real intention of the AIG 
bailout was to send the message to the international 
FRPPXQLW\ WKDW WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHVZRXOG VWDQG EHKLQG$,*·V
credit swaps.  If AIG failed, bonds issued by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, among others, would have lost their value, 
thereby adversely affecting security holders such as central 
banks throughout the world.  In the case of AIG, history will 
show that the profits were indeed privatized with the losses 
being passed on to the public.  In time, the public will know 
that mortgage foreclosures were the furthest thing from 
Secretary 3DXOVRQ·VPLQG WKDW IDWHIul weekend in September 
when the bubble burst.  His eyes were on Beijing, not Peoria. 
 
30. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, Giant Insurer May Get 
More in U.S. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at A1. 
31. Matthew Karnitschnig, Liam Pleven, & Serena Ng, A.I.G. Seeks to 
Ease Its Bailout Terms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at A1;; Mary Williams 
Walsh & Michael J. de la Merced, $V $,*·V /RVVHV *URZ ,WV 6XUYLYDO
Options Shrink, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at B5. 
32. Walsh & de la Merced, supra note 31. 
33. Id.  See Joe Nocera, Propping Up A House of Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 2009, at BU1, for a capsule lesson on the AIG drama. 
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/HW·V PDNH WKLQJV D OLWWOH PRUH FRPSOLFDWHG  ,Q  D
WHDPDW-30RUJDQ&KDVH	&R´-30RUJDQµGHYHORSHGDQHZ
kind of financial instrument which combined CDOs and credit 
default swaps.34  CDOs were underlain by real mortgages given 
by individual corporate lenders to lenders, and credit default 
swaps were essentially insurance policies taken out by lenders.  
However, this new financial instrument called a synthetic 
collateralized default obligation, or synthetic CDO, derived its 
value not from concrete instruments such as mortgages, but 
from contracts linked to those mortgages, hence the term 
´GHULYDWLYHVµ35  The fact that they were derived from the 
contract brought rise WRWKHXVHRIWKHWHUP´GHULYDWLYHVµ36  The 
ZRUG´V\QWKHWLFµVKRXOGKDYHEHHQDFOXHWRLQYHVWRUVWRWKURZ
up a red flag.  However, synthetic CDOs generated outsized 
returns which resulted in more and more investors purchasing 
them.  Many did not actually know what they were buying.  
The complexity of these instruments is mind boggling, but 
suffice it to say, when the values of real mortgages began to fall 
because of rising defaults and foreclosure rates, the value of 
synthetic investments began to drop even faster.37  The 
investment banks that created, promoted, and sold these 
investments began to suffer staggering losses, thus eating into 
their capital.38  To protect the banking system, something had 
to be done.  The investment bank Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 
failed to raise enough capital and had to be rescued by 
JPMorgan and the federal taxpayer for less than the value of 
its headquarters building.39  The Treasury allowed another 
investment bank, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., to go into 
bankruptcy,40 an event which some experts believe only made 
 
34. Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at BU1. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See, e.g., id. (describing such a situation). 
39. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., JPMorgan and Fed Move to Bail Out 
Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008, at BU1. 
40. See, for example, Ben White & Michael M. Grynbaum, The Street 
After Lehman Brothers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C1, for a blow-­by-­blow, 
minute-­by-­minute description of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
11
2009] CAN·T LIVE WITHOUT AIR 191 
 
things worse for the world economy.41  Merrill Lynch & Co., 
Inc. rushed into the saving arms of Bank of America.42  When 
the air which securitization pumped into the real estate bubble 
ILQDOO\OHGWRWKHEXEEOH·VEXUsting, securitization, like animals 
in the wild, had eaten its young.  Alan S. Blinder, Professor of 
Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University asked 
UKHWRULFDOO\ ´>'@RHV DQ\RQH GRXEW WKDW WKH ILQDQFLDO WXUPRLO
would have been less severe if derivatives trading had acquired 
D]RRNHHSHUDGHFDGHDJR"µ43 
Securitization had a more nefarious effect closer to home 
for those who purchased the mortgages.  Every securitization 
starts with a single mortgage.  When the borrower defaults and 
fails to make a payment due upon that mortgage, the usual 
remedy for the lender to realize its secured interest is 
foreclosure.  To be successful in a foreclosure action, indeed 
even to make it past the courthouse door, the lender must 
prove to the court that it owns the mortgage.  As noted above, 
securitization involves the slicing, dicing, and re-­packaging of 
mortgages.  Most states have recording statutes which require 
that a mortgage must be assigned of record when its ownership 
changes.44  Within the foreclosure bar and the foreclosure 
defense bar, it is no secret that one of the effects of the 
packaging, securitization, and sale of mortgages is that the 
assignment chain and actual documentation of mortgage 
ownership have failed to keep up.  Ironically, the pooling and 
packaging of mortgages³the securitization process³which 
enabled lenders to make even more mortgages and greater 
profits, has made it more difficult for those lenders to foreclose 
when the mortgages go bad.45  The process also makes it more 
 
41. Eric Dash, et al., 5 days of Pressure, Fear and Ultimately, Failure, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008. 
42. See, e.g., Louise Story & Julie Creswell, Love Was Blind, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2009, at BU1 (detailing the unhappy marriage between Merrill Lynch 
and Bank of America). 
43. Alan S. Blinder, Six Blunders En Route to a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2009, at BU7. 
44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 701.02 (West 2009);; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-­
2223 (2008);; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2009).  See also JAMES 
KARP & ELLIOT KLAYMAN, REAL ESTATE LAW (5th ed. 2003);; DAVID A. 
SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS (2004). 
45. Gretchen Morgenson, How One Borrower Beat the Foreclosure 
Machine, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at BU1. 
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difficult for borrowers to modify their mortgages in a bid to 
ward off foreclosure³a difficulty which even President Obama 
KDV VDLG ´PDNHV QR VHQVHµ46  It is well known that original 
mortgage documents are routinely lost somewhere between the 
initial lender, the loan servicer, and the purchaser of the CDO 
that includes the mortgage (or a part of it).  As a result, it is 
RIWHQDQ\RQH·VJXHVVDVWRZKRDFWXDOO\RZQVRUKDVSRVVHVVLRQ
of the original mortgage.  When the issue at hand may result in 
someone losing their home, the courts have not been willing to 
DFFHSW´DQ\RQH·VJXHVVµDVWKHDSSURSULDWHOHJDOVWDQGDUG47 
The problem of lost loan documentation leading to a lender 
(or loan servicer) losing the standing to foreclose upon a 
mortgage very recently caught more of the naWLRQDO PHGLD·V
attention.  In her article for the New York Times, Gretchen 
0RUJHQVRQQRWHGWKDW´ERRNNHHSLQJµWKHSURSHUDVVLJQPHQWRI
pooled mortgages and the recording of those assignments in the 
public record, was not a priority of many big banks.48  
´%ookkeeping is such a bore, especially when there are billions 
to be made shoveling loans into trusts like coal into the 
7LWDQLF·V ERLOHUV  <RX FDQ LPDJLQH WKH WKRXJKW SURFHVV
Assigning notes takes time and costs money, why bother?  
:KR·V JRLQJ WR DVN IRU proof of ownership of these notes 
DQ\KRZ"µ49  Ms. Morgenson wrote: 
 
No one knows how many loans went into 
securitization trusts with defective 
documentation.  But as messes go, this one has, 
ahem, potential. According to Inside Mortgage 
Finance, some eight million nonprime mortgages 
were put into securities pools in 2005 and 2006 
and sold to investors.  The value of these loans 
was $797 billion in 2005 and $815 billion in 
2006.50 
 
 
46. Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Plan on Housing Said to Push on 
Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at B1. 
47. Morgenson, supra note 11. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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As reported by Ms. Morgenson, bankruptcy judges throughout 
the country have started to deny motions to permit foreclosure 
where the lender cannot prove ownership of the mortgage.51  R. 
Glen Ayers, a former bankruptcy judge in Texas, and an expert 
in the area, VD\V WKDW IRU OHQGHUV ´>L@W·VDKXJHSUREOHP    
,W·V JRLQJ WR EH H[SHQVLYH , GRQ·W NQRZ KRZ H[SHQVLYH
XOWLPDWHO\WRWKHERQGKROGHUVµ52  Of course, the possibility that 
courts may deny foreclosure to lenders can only decrease the 
value of the CDOs and CMOs based upon those mortgages that 
the lenders are holding as assets in their vaults.  Translated, 
because of bad documentation, the major banks will experience 
even greater losses and will need even more capital to 
survive³capital that, to date, only taxpayers have the 
wherewithal to provide.53  And the nightmares of both the 
bankers and the taxpayers, who apparently may have to pay 
the bill, have begun. 
Beginning in Ohio, and quickly spreading to New York, 
many courts have either delayed or tossed out foreclosure 
actions where the plaintiff-­lender has been unable to show 
public record ownership of the subject mortgage.54  The case of 
Mamie Ruth Palmer, a seventy-­four year old former 
housekeeper living in Atlanta, made the popular press.  In 
2002, Ms. Palmer filed for bankruptcy to protect her home from 
foreclosure.  The note securing the loan was assigned to the 
Bank of New York in September 2002;; two months after the 
EDQNKDGEHJXQ LWV IRUHFORVXUHDFWLRQ 0V3DOPHU·VDWWRUQH\
argued that since the bank did not own the note at the time it 
started its foreclosure action, it did not have standing to 
foreclose.  Rather than risk an adverse ruling, the bank settled 
with Ms. Palmer by reducing the balance of her mortgage from 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. See Tyler Cowen, Three Rocky Roads To a Bank Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 1, 2009, at BU5 (summarizing the capital problems which the banks 
and taxpayers are facing). 
54. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 07CV2282, 2007 WL 3232430 
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing several foreclosure actions where 
owners failed to follow the recording requirements of Ohio law).  See also 
Morgenson, supra note 11 (discussing court decisions enforcing the mortgage 
recording requirement). 
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$100,000 to $59,000.55 
Suzanne Garcia and I have written on the subject of 
standing under New York law.56  Without repeating here the 
case summaries discussed elsewhere, it should be noted that in 
cases decided since the publication of our respective articles, 
the courts have held that lenders who succeed to ownership of 
a mortgage by assignment that is recorded after the lender 
initiated a foreclosure action (a retroactive assignment) lack 
standing to foreclose.57  One court has asked a lender to explain 
why it purchased a non-­performing loan.58  Securitization 
begets confusion even within the same lender.  While the 
OHQGHU·V ULJKW KDQG ZDV QHJRWLDWLQJ D VHWWOHPHQW ZLWK WKH
ERUURZHU WKH OHQGHU·V OHIW KDQG ZDV EXV\ FRQGXFWLQJ D
IRUHFORVXUHVDOH7KHFRXUWIRXQGWKHEDQNFRXQVHO·VFRQGXFWLQ
bringing a motion for default judgment to have been 
´XQFRQVFLRQDEOH GLVKRQRUDEOH DQG XQSURIHVVLRQDOµ59  How 
ZRXOG \RX OLNH WR EH LQ WKDW FRXQVHO·V VKRHV WKHQH[W WLPHKH
appears before that judge? 
Securitization was undoubtedly a major contributor to the 
air that expanded the real estate bubble over the last few 
years.  When the bubble burst, securitization having run amok 
ZDVRQHRIWKHPDMRUFDXVHVRIWKHEXEEOH·VVXGGHQDQGDEUXSW
destruction.  It will take years to fully understand and recover 
from the impact that securitization had on the bubble and, as 
we shall soon see, also upon the world economy. 
 
IV. Globalization 
 
+HUH´JOREDOL]DWLRQµUHIHUVWRWKHVSUHDGRIGHEW, which is 
 
55. Morgenson, supra note 45. 
56. Suzanne M. Garcia, A New Perspective on Foreclosure in Title, N.Y. 
L.J., Aug. 25, 2008, at S4.  See also Marvin N. Bagwell, Judges Take Notice of 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, N.Y. REAL EST. L. REP., Apr. 2008, at 1;; Marvin N. 
Bagwell, Home Equity Theft Prevention Act, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 2008, at 5. 
57. See Washington Mut. Bank v. Patterson, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 2009, at 
29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 2008);; New Century Mortgage Corp. v. Durden, 
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 2009, at 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2009). 
58. 'HXWVFKH%DQN1DW·O7UXVW&RY&DPSEHOON.Y. L.J., Dec. 24, 2008, 
at 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2008). 
59. 'HXWVFKH%DQN1DW·O7Uust Co. v. Miele, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 2008, at 
19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 2008). 
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created in the United States, across international borders.  A 
home mortgage secured by real estate located in Fort Myers, 
Florida could end up on the books of a bank based in Oslo, 
Norway.  In reality, the Oslo bank purchases the CMO or CDO 
that contains the Fort Myers mortgage as one of the thousands 
therein, and records the security as an asset on its books.  
Viewed this way, it is easy to see that globalization and 
securitization go hand in hand.  For example, just look at the 
case headings cited in footnotes 57 and 58, supra.60  Like the 
proverbial chicken and the egg, it is difficult to tell which came 
first.  However, it is very clear that if it were not for the 
globalization of finance (and by finance, I mean borrowing and 
OHQGLQJ WKH $PHULFDQ PRUWJDJH ´FRQWDJLRQµ WKDW VSUHDG
around the world would have been contained within our very 
own borders.  Globalization therefore contributed to the air 
that inflated the real estate bubble.  The story is one of supply 
and demand. 
Let us start with an American household. 
To cure the tech crash of 2000, the Federal Reserve Bank, 
under the leadership of Alan Greenspan, kept American 
interest rates relatively low.  This, in turn, made money very 
cheap.  At the same time, thanks to the securitization 
pioneered by Wall Street, the mortgage lending business 
transformed from a local business to one with access to 
international funding.  More money meant that more and more 
people had the opportunity to borrow.  The fact that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were on a mission, spreading 
homeownership as much as possible, added nourishment to the 
contagion.  When you add the perception that the value of 
American housing had never declined, the atmosphere becomes 
even headier.  Sure of ever-­increasing home values, Americans 
started to view their homes as ATM machines.  As home prices 
go up, more equity is created, which people can borrow 
against³and they do so.  Households then use their cashed-­out 
equity to buy things, especially plasma televisions and other 
toys made in China and other low wage countries, for both 
children and adults.  $PHULFDQV KDYH DOVR ERXJKW ELJ 689·V
which use oil³lots of oil³imported from places like Saudi 
 
60. See supra notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text. 
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Arabia, Russia and Venezuela.  To pay for these things, we 
send our dollars there.  To keep the dollars coming, these 
countries buy our debt, issued by the Treasury Department as 
well as Fannie and Freddie.  The money from this debt is then 
re-­circulated back into our economy so that we can buy more 
toys.  The increase in the supply of money leads to an increase 
in the demand of goods.  To maintain demand, and to keep 
their economies growing, foreign nations continued to supply 
funding to the American economy so that Americans could buy 
more of their goods.61  ,WZDVDVLI6LU(OWRQ-RKQ·VCircle of Life 
had left the Lion King behind on the Broadway stage and 
headed for the international economy, which indeed, is exactly 
what happened. 
For their part, the banks did two major things: (1) they 
securitized the mortgages that American households had used 
for the cash to buy goods and invest in more property because 
real estate prices were only going up, and (2) they sold those 
securities to banks and institutions throughout the world.  
Hence, the globalization of American homeowner borrowing 
resulted.  Those who bought these securities wanted greater 
returns, so the bankers and the mortgage lenders who supplied 
them invented ways to increase the return.  Thus, subprime 
mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages were born.  And to 
further increase the supply of mortgages, lenders created their 
SURJHQ\ ´QR-­GRFVµ QR LQFRPH YHULILFDWLRQ ORDQV VR-­called 
´QLQMD ORDQVµ QR LQFRPH QR MRE QR DVVHWV ´H[SORGLQJ ORDQVµ
(loans where the interest rate adjusted rapidly and 
VXUSULVLQJO\XSZDUGVDQG OLDU·V ORDQV QRQRWKLQJ62  It is no 
wonder that Time magazine named Angelo Mozilo, the founder 
of Countrywide Financial (now Bank of America Home Loans), 
one of the major subprime purveyors, as the number one 
person to blame for the economic meltdown.63  So returns went 
up for investors, and, after seeing the outsized returns, more 
investors wanted in.  To increase their returns, many investors 
 
61. See Neall Ferguson, Reasons to Worry, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, § 6 
(Magazine), at 46. 
62. See Jack Rosenthal, On Language, No Docs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2008, § MM (Magazine), at 18 (providing a glossary of subprime mortgage 
terms). 
63. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 21. 
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resorted to borrowing money to leverage their investments. 
  
They made $100 million bets with only $1 million 
of their own money and $99 million in debt.  If 
the value of the investment rose to just $101 
million, the investors would double their money. 
. . . 
If that $100 million investment . . . were to lose 
just $1 million of its value, the investor who put 
up only $1 million would lose everything.64 
 
Professor Blinder regards permitting sky-­high leveraging, such 
as in the aforementioned example, as one of the six blunders 
made by regulators that contributed to the current financial 
crisis,65 but more on this later.  Securities based upon 
mortgages made in the United States found their way into the 
investment coffers of banks, pension funds, municipalities, and 
governments throughout the world.  Then the contagion hit.  
Many commentators believe that the seminal event was the 
7UHDVXU\·V GHFLVLRQ WR OHW /HKPDQ %URWKHUV IDLO DQG HQWHU
bankruptcy.66  This forced the holder of mortgage-­backed 
securities to see exactly what they had purchased.  To their 
horror, they discovered that their formerly valuable CMO and 
CDO asset holdings were based upon subprime mortgages or 
worse.  As noted above in the section on securitization, the 
UDWLQJ DJHQFLHV· UDWLQJV ZHUH PHDQLQJOHVV DQG the insurance 
provided by AIG was suspect since AIG only had billions in 
capital to pay trillions of dollars in possible claims.67  The giant 
Swiss bank, UBS, thought to be one of the most conservative 
and careful investors in the world, found itself holding $80 
billion in U.S. mortgage-­backed securities on which it, by late 
2007, had suffered a $37 billion loss with an additional $30 
billion waiting to be recognized.  Its shareholders lost one half 
of the value of their stock and its chairman lost his job.68 
 
64. David Leonhardt, &DQ·W *UDVS &UHGLW &ULVLV" -RLQ WKH &OXE, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at A1. 
65. Blinder, supra note 43. 
66. Id. 
67. See discussion supra Part III. 
68. Nelson D. Schwartz, The Mortgage Bust Goes Global, N.Y. TIMES, 
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The contagion continues to spread.69  Governments, 
including those based in London, Berlin, Dublin, Amsterdam, 
and Brussels, have had to seize major banks and lenders.70  
Essentially, the governments had to seize or pump funds into 
banks because the losses that the banks experienced from their 
bad investments in American mortgage-­back securities wiped 
out their capital.  The banks became the walking dead³
´]RPELHVµ³unable to lend or borrow.71  Without access to 
credit, neither consumers nor businesses can obtain funds to 
buy goods or to expand.  The Troubled Asset Recovery Program 
´7$53µ LQLWLDWHG E\ WKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ LQ6HSWHPEHU
ZDVPHDQW WR UHSOHQLVK WKH EDQNV· FDSLWDO VR WKDW WKH\
would start lending again.  It is obvious from the daily 
headlines that TARP did not work.72  Currently, both 
nationally and worldwide, we are experiencing no growth or 
actual falling economies.  That is, by definition, a financial 
crisis.  And it all started with home mortgages, the payment on 
which people could not make.  But as we have seen, and will 
continue to see throughout this Article, the fault does not 
necessarily lie with the borrowers.  As Time PDJD]LQH·VOLVWRI
twenty-­five indicates,73 there is enough blame to go around.74 
The bursting of the real estate bubble in the United States 
PHDQWWKDWWKHFRQVXPHUV·$70VKDGUXQGU\:LWKQRFDVKWR
spend, the demand for goods by consumers in the United States 
plummeted.  As a result of the lack of demand for goods in 
$PHULFD·V UHFHVVLRQDU\ HFRQomy, China estimates that 20 
million of its 130 million migrant workers are now 
unemployed.75  According to the United Nations, 50 million 
people throughout the world could lose their jobs by the end of 
 
Apr. 6, 2008, at B1. 
69. Mark Landler, The U.S. Financial Crisis Is Spreading to Europe, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at C1. 
70. Id. 
71. Paul Krugman, Banking on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at 
A27. 
72. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Bailout Needs Some Strings Attached 
to Limit Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at BU1. 
73. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 21. 
74. See Bagwell, supra note 2, at 3. 
75. Keith Bradsher, &KLQD·V 8QHPSOR\PHQW 6ZHOOV DV ([SRUWV )DOWHU, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at B4. 
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2009 because of the recession that began in the United States.76  
Both Russia and China, two nations that invested heavily in 
American debt, have blamed the United States for their 
financial crisis.77  These accusations could have been meant as 
propaganda to play for the audiences at home, but the Chinese 
and Russian people are beginning to suffer.  The American 
economic crisis has affected Russian used car dealers in specific 
ways.78  'HDOHUV LQ 9ODGLYRVWRN D FLW\ RQ 5XVVLD·V HDVWHUQ
IURQWLHU URVH XS LQ SURWHVWV DJDLQVW WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V
imposition of tariffs against foreign cars.79  Russia raised tariffs 
to protect its foreign currency reserves, which are being 
drained by (1) a fall in the demand for oil;; and (2) a run on the 
ruble, which was caused by its own hard times that the 
Kremlin believes were brought on by the American financial 
crisis.80  7KH IHDUHG SHRSOH·V SURWHVW WKDW SRVHV WKH ELJJHVW
threat to the Putin regime may be attributed to the 
international financial crisis, brought on by the bursting of the 
American real estate bubble. 
The global economic instability brought on by the 
American recession, which in turn finds its roots in the 
bursting of our real estate bubble, poses the top threat to our 
own national security, even outpacing terrorism, according to 
Dennis C. Blair, the American Director of National 
Intelligence.81  In testimony before Congress, Mr. Blair stated 
WKDW´>W@KHFULVLV>WKDW@VWDUWHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDV
[already] increased questioning of U.S. stewardship of the 
global economy.µ82  Not only was the globalization of American 
mortgage debt a part of the air that inflated the real estate 
 
76. Nelson D. Schwartz, Unemployment Surges Around the World, 
Threatening Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at A1. 
77. Carter Dougherty & Katrin Bennhold, Russia and China Blame 
Capitalist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A21. 
78. Clifford J. Levy, Rash of Tariff Protests in Vladivostok Has the 
Kremlin on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at A6. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Mark Mazzetti, Global Economic Crisis Poses Top Threat to U.S., 
Spy Chief Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A14. 
82. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 111TH CONG., ANNUAL THREAT 
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 3 (Feb. 12, 2009) (statement for 
the record of Admiral Dennis C. Blair), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf. 
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bubble, it was also part and parcel of what ultimately caused 
the bubble to burst.  That which American borrowers and 
lenders, as well as international investors, spread throughout 
the world may return to exact no small measure of restitution 
and, dare I say, retribution. 
 
V. Speculation 
 
´6SHFXODWLRQµ LV GHILQHG DV WKH ´HQJDJHPHQW LQ EXVLQHVV
transactions involving considerable risk but offering the chance 
of large gains, [especially] trading in commodities, stocks, etc., 
LQWKHKRSHRISURILWIURPFKDQJHVLQWKHPDUNHWSULFHµ83  Every 
financial bubble involves some form of speculation³that is, 
taking great risks in the hope of obtaining great profits.  I have 
already discussed some forms of speculation in this Article.  
For example, homeowners who engaged in seriatim borrowing 
against the equity in their homes were speculating that the 
values of their homes would continue to rise.  The banks that 
used leveraging, that is, the use of borrowed money to magnify 
gains, such as the hypothetical investor discussed earlier who 
borrowed $100 million to increase the profit on their $1 million 
investment, are speculators.84 
No discussion of financial speculation can begin without 
taking note of the tulip mania that gripped Holland in the 
seventeenth century.  Mark Frankel, in his review of Mike 
'DVK·VERRN7XOLSRPDQLD7KH6WRU\RIWKH:RUOG·V0RVW
Coveted Flower & The Extraordinary Passions It Aroused, tells 
the story.85  Tulips had been prized since the mid-­1550s for 
their extraordinary beauty, purity and sharpness of colors, and 
extravagant presentation.86  The fact that it took seven years to 
grow a tulip from seed to bulb only added to its allure.87  By the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, Holland was at the peak 
 
83. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/speculation 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2009). 
84. See Thomas L. Friedman, Op-­Ed., All Fall Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
26, 2008, at A33 (providing a biting critique of speculation by a lender). 
85. Mark Frankel, When the Tulip Bubble Burst, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 
24, 2000, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_17/b3678084.htm. 
86. See MIKE DASH, TULIPOMANIA 27-­35 (1999). 
87. Id. at 56. 
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of its power, with the merchants in Amsterdam making 400% 
profits on their East Indies trading.88  These wealthy Dutch 
displayed their riches by building grand estates surrounded by 
elaborate flower gardens that featured rare and exquisite 
tulips.89  In 1624, a man in Amsterdam who owned the only 
twelve bulbs of a midnight blue tulip topped by a band of pure 
white and accented by crimson flares was offered as high as 
3,000 guilders for one bulb.90  By comparison, Rembrandt 
received only half that amount when he painted his 
masterpiece, the Night Watch.91  Prices rose steadily 
throughout the 1630s and speculators entered the marketplace.  
In the winter of 1636-­37, one rare tulip bulb that was about to 
split in two was sold at auction for 5,200 guilders.92  Some 
bulbs were changing hands in the marketplace ten times a 
day.93  Then came the crash.  All it took was one buyer in 
Haarlem who refused to pay for a bulb that he had purchased 
at auction.94  Panic struck, and within days, the marketplace 
had all but vanished.  Bulbs, which had routinely commanded 
5,000 guilders days before, began to trade for fifty guilders.95  
Great fortunes evaporated overnight.96 
The tulip mania story is so evocative because every 
financial bubble since has followed the same course.  I could 
substitute railroad stocks for tulips and end up with a similar 
description of the mid-­nineteenth century collapse in the 
market for railroad securities;; substitute stocks, and I could 
describe what happened in 1929;; substitute VKDUHVLQ´GRWFRPµ
companies, and we end up with the dot.com bust of the late 
1990s.  Today, we read the story of the real estate bubble, and 
´0F0DQVLRQVµDQG´IOLSSLQJµFRPHWRPLQG6FKRODUVFDQSRLQW
out differences among the financial speculations involved in 
HDFK EXEEOH·V EXUVWLng, but because human nature has 
remained virtually unchanged over the centuries, the 
 
88. Id. at 71. 
89. Id. at 78-­79. 
90. Id. at 82. 
91. Id. at x. 
92. Id. at 152. 
93. Id. at 156. 
94. Id. at 162-­63. 
95. Id. at 165. 
96. Frankel, supra note 85. 
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framework remains the same. 
More recently, in 2007, the marketplace for commercial 
real estate was at its highest.  Sam Zell, a billionaire real 
estate investor based in Chicago sold 573 commercial 
properties located throughout the United States to the 
Blackstone Group for $39 billion.97  %ODFNVWRQH ´LPPHGLDWHO\
flipped hundreds of those building [to sixteen different groups] 
IRUELOOLRQµ98  It was promoted as the deal of the century, 
and unfortunately for all involved, it may have been.  Charles 
V. Bagli of the New York Times wrote that, 
 
[t]oday, the wreckage of those purchases is 
strewn across the country, from Southern 
California to Austin, Texas, to Chicago to New 
York.  Many of the [sixteen] companies that 
ERXJKW >6DP =HOO·V SURSHUWLHV@ DUH QRZ VWXFN
with punishing debt, properties whose values are 
plummeting and millions of feet of office space 
they cannot fill.99 
 
Mr. Bagli then goes oQDWOHQJWKGHVFULELQJKRZWKH´GHDORIWKH
FHQWXU\µGHVWUR\HGDOPRVWHYHU\FRPSDQ\ZKRLQYHVWHGDWWKH
top of the market.100  One of the buyers was the legendary New 
York real estate mogul Harry Macklowe, who purchased seven 
buildings from Blackstone.101  Macklowe and his family put 
down only $50 million of their personal fortune and leveraged 
it into $7 billion in short term, high-­interest debt in order to 
finance the acquisitions.102  Within two years, because of the 
bursting real estate bubble, Macklowe was forced to turn over 
several of the buildings to his lenders.103  The lenders then 
turned around and sold those buildings for 25% less than what 
 
97. Charles V. Bagli, 6DP=HOO·V(PSLUH8QGHUZDWHULQD%LJ:D\, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at B1. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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Macklowe had originally paid for them.104  %RWKWKH´OHYHUDJHHµ
DQG WKH ´OHYHUDJRUµ ORVW VSHFWDFXODUO\  ,Q RUGHU WR avoid 
personal bankruptcy and other defaults, Macklowe was also 
IRUFHGWRVHOOWKHIDPLO\·VFURZQMHZHOWKH*0%XLOGLQJZKLFK
it had acquired in 2003.105  Macklowe, a well-­known and 
admired risk-­taker, had speculated and lost. 
Speculation by consumers added to the real estate bubble.  
Hannah Fairfield of the New York Times wrote, ´RYHUEXLOGLQJ
in regions of Florida, California and other states with housing 
bubbles lured overeager residents to become speculators, 
buying up many homes with the expectation that their value 
ZRXOG ULVHµ106  Florida has been the national poster child for 
consumer speculation.  In Lehigh Acres, a suburb of Fort 
0\HUV ´IURP  WR WKH HQG RI  GHYHORSHUV FRPSOHWHG
13,183 units . . . , nearly doubling the total stock of 15,216 that 
H[LVWHG LQ µ107  As a result, housing prices doubled and 
then tripled.108  ´6RPHWLPHV KRXVHV ZRXOG VHOO WKUHH RU IRXU
WLPHV LQ D IHZPRQWKV DQG QR RQH ZRXOG PRYH LQ    µ109  
6SHFXODWLRQ DQG WKH ´IOLSSLQJµ WKDW DFFRPSDQLHV LW were 
rampant.  Then, in 2007, it all went away³the bubble had 
burst.110  Perhaps George Packer, in his article, The Ponzi 
6WDWH )ORULGD·V )RUHFORVXUH 'LVDVWHU, offered the best 
description of the real estate speculative fever that gripped 
Florida and its aftermath.111 
In his article, Mr. Packer takes the reader on a journey 
along State Road 54 in Pasco County, Florida³a road running 
 
104. Id. 
105. Charles V. Bagli, Macklowes Sell G.M. Building for $2.9 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at A27. 
106. Hannah Fairfield, In the Shadow of Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2008, at N4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/business/06metricstext.html.  The chart 
accompanying the article that illustrates subprime mortgages as a 
percentage of all mortgages is especially edifying. 
107. Damien Cave, )ORULGD·V &URVVURDGV RI )RUHFORVXUH DQG 'HVSDLU, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at A1. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. (quoting Bob Elliot). 
110. Id. 
111. George Packer, 7KH 3RQ]L 6WDWH )ORULGD·V )RUHFORVXUH 'LVDVWHU, 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 9 & 16, 2009, at 81. 
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forty-­five minutes northeast of Tampa.112  In 1950, twenty 
WKRXVDQGSHRSOHOLYHGLQ3DVFR&RXQW\ %\WKHFRXQW\·V
population had grown to half a million residents.113  Over the 
past few years, around one thousand people a day moved to 
Florida.114  This population growth fueled a real estate boom 
WKDWZDV´ELJJHUDQGJDXGLHUWKDQDQ\WKLQJWKHVWDWHKDGHYHU
VHHQµ115  Flat and desolate fields became housing developments 
RI ´ORRN-­alike two-­VWRU\EHLJHDQG\HOORZKRXVHVµ WKDWVROG IRU
two to three hundred thousand dollars.116  The homes in turn 
OHGWR´VKRSSLQJPDOOVDQGPHJD-­FKXUFKHVµEXWE\LWZDV
all over.117  7KHGHYHORSPHQWVKDGEHFRPH´JKRVWVXEGLYLVLRQVµ
full of houses in which no one lived because the growth was all 
a mirage³fueled by the perception of future growth.118  In the 
words of Gary Mormino, a professor of history at the University 
RI6RXWK)ORULGD ´)ORULGD LQVRPHZD\VUHVHPEOHVDPRGHUQ
Ponzi scheme.  Everything is fine for me if a thousand 
newcomers come tomorrow.  The problem is, except for a few 
road bumps³· ¶ DQG WKH\ ZHUH UHDOO\ PLQRU³no one 
NQHZ ZKDW ZRXOG KDSSHQ LI WKH\ VWRSSHG FRPLQJµ119  In a 
description that is destined to become classic, Mr. Packer notes 
WKDW´>E\@WKHKRXVLQJPDUNHWLQ)ORULGDZDVKRWWHUWKDQ
LWKDGHYHUEHHQDQGIUHQ]\VSUHDGDFURVVDOOOHYHOVRIVRFLHW\µ 
120  Many of the migrant farm workers from the area were able 
to find jobs in the construction industry, working as roofers and 
drywall hangers.121 
 
Nearly everyone you met around Tampa had a 
5HDOWRU·V OLFHQVH RU D EURNHU·V OLFHQVH RU ZDV D
title agent.  $OH[6LQNWKHVWDWH·VFKLHIILQDQFLDO
RIILFHU DQG D 'HPRFUDW VDLG ´When the 
\DUGPDQFRPHVDQG VD\VKH·VQRWJRLQJ WRPRZ
 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 83 (internal quotations omitted). 
120. Id. at 84. 
121. Id. 
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\RXU\DUGDQ\PRUHEHFDXVHKH·VJRLQJWREHFRPH
a mortgage broker, that is a sure sign that 
VRPHWKLQJLVZURQJµ122 
 
The process of flipping houses and condominiums became an 
amateur pursuit for those in the middle-­class.123  ´3HRSOHZKR
drew modest salaries at their jobs not only owned a house, but 
bought other houses as speculators, the way average 
$PHULFDQVHOVHZKHUHGDEEOHLQGD\WUDGLQJµ124  It was destined 
not to end well. 
Packer goes on LQ KLV DUWLFOH WR GLVFXVV WKH ´GRZQZDUG
VSLUDOµRIWKH)ORULGDPDUNHWQRWLQJ 
 
:KHQ DW WKH )ORULGD·V PDUNHW·V GL]]\LQJ PLG-­
decade height, speculators lost confidence, the 
faith that kept the state aloft gave way and the 
economy plummeted like a Looney Tunes 
character who, suspended in midair, suddenly 
looks down.  Property values did what the lender 
and borrowers somehow never imagined was 
possible: they started to decline.  Today, the 
average unit in Fort Myers and Cape Coral is 
selling for just a hundred and fifty-­eight 
thousand dollars, less than half of what it sold 
for at the height.125 
 
The Wall Street Journal UHSRUWHGWKDW´WZR\HDUVDJRWKH/HH
County court system [which covers Fort Myers and Coral 
Grove] had about 1,900 foreclosure cases on the books.  That 
QXPEHUVZHOOHGWRE\ WKHEHJLQQLQJRI >@µ126  The 
average time that it takes a judge to dispose of a case?  Fifteen 
seconds.127 
Speculation, if dabbled in here and there, is not bad.  Its 
 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 88. 
126. Michael Corkery, $)ORULGD&RXUW·V ´5RFNHW'RFNHWµ%ODVW7KURXJK
Foreclosure Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at A1. 
127. Id. 
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use is driven by the desire to make a profit, a concept that is at 
the core of capitalism.  However, it is when speculation runs 
amok, and people or institutions begin to speculate with other 
SHRSOH·VPRQH\WKDWVRFLHW\KDVDELJSUREOHP³a problem that 
usually results in financial ruin for those who come late into 
the game or at the height of the market.  Of course, as both Mr. 
Packer and the Wall Street Journal observe, not all people who 
are being foreclosed out of their homes are speculators.128  Most 
are innocent people who have suffered a misfortune, such as a 
job loss, medical ailment, or some other personal setback that 
has deprived them of their income and thus, the ability to meet 
their monthly mortgage payments.  The true speculators, 
especially the scoundrels, are long gone, and they took their 
profits with them.  Whether the bubble surrounds tulips, 
railroad bonds, stock certificates, dot.com companies, or real 
estate, speculation inflates the bubble, and then it bursts.  
Unlike Wile E. Coyote, Sylvester the Cat, or Daffy Duck, the 
person holding the Acme anvil might not survive the fall. 
 
VI. Regulation 
 
About a century ago, Mark Twain commented that money 
LVQRWWKHURRWRIDOOHYLOEXWUDWKHU´WKHODFNRIPRQH\LVWKH
URRW RI DOO HYLOµ129  In the case of our current financial crisis, 
experts agree that it was not regulation, but the lack thereof 
that permitted securitization, speculation, and the side effects 
RI JOREDOL]DWLRQ WR FUHDWH WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV OHDGLQJ WR WRGD\·V
financial crises.  The real estate bubble³more properly, the 
bursting of the bubble³is the parent of the crisis.  In this 
context, the lack of regulation enabled the progeny³the 
financial crisis³to come into being. 
As discussed earlier in this Article, Time magazine 
recently listed the twenty-­five people to blame for the financial 
meltdown.130  Of the twenty-­five people who made the list, 
almost one-­quarter were in a position to regulate the financial 
marketplace.  A review of those six individuals places the 
 
128. Id.;; Packer, supra note 111. 
129. THE WIT AND WISDOM OF MARK TWAIN (Paul Negri ed., 1999). 
130. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20. 
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apparent fruits of deregulation into historical context.  Number 
two on the list, former Senator Phil Gramm, was Chairman of 
the Senate Banking Committee from 1995 through 2000.131  
*UDPPZDVDQ´RXWVSRNHQFKDPSLRQRIILQDQFLDOGHUHJXODWLRQ
He played a leading role in . . . the 1999 repeal of the Glass-­
Steagall Act,132 which separated commercial banks from Wall 
6WUHHW>LQYHVWPHQWEDQNV@µ133  This led to the creation of major 
financial institutions such as Citicorp, which, in trying to be all 
things to all lenders and borrowers, accrued huge losses and 
then had to be bailed out by the Treasury Department.134  
Gramm is also responsible for a provision in the 2000 
Commodity Futures Act135 that exempted derivatives-­like 
credit default swaps from regulation.136  Senator Gramm takes 
issue with his having any blame for the financial crisis.137  In 
his Op-­Ed piece for the Wall Street Journal, he blames the 
´SROLWLFL]DWLRQµ RI PRUWJDJH OHQGHUV DV H[HPSOLILHG E\ WKH
Community Reinvestment Act,138 ZKLFK ´OHG UHJXODWRUV WR
foster looser underwriting and encouraged the making of more 
DQG PRUHPDUJLQDO ORDQVµ DQG WKH  +RXVLQJ %LOO ZKLFK
´VHWTXRWDVRU¶WDUJHWV·WKDW)DQQLHDQG)UHGGLHZHUHWRDFKLHYH
in meeting the housing needs of low and moderate income 
$PHULFDQVµDV WKH ´SULPDU\ FDXVH RI WKLV FULVLVµ139  However, 
months earlier, in the Op-­Ed pages of that very same 
newspaper, Thomas Frank published an article predicting that 
conservatives would blame Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for 
 
131. Id. 
132. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-­Steagall), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, repealed 
by Gramm-­Leach-­Bliley, Pub. L. No. 106-­102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified 
in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
133. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20 (internal footnote added). 
134. See, e.g., David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling 
Citigroup, WALL ST. J1RYDW$´7KHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWDJUHHG
Sunday night to rescue Citigroup Inc. by helping to absorb potentially 
hundreds of billions of dollars in losses on toxic assets on its balance sheet . . . 
µ 
135. Commodities Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-­554, § 
1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
136. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20. 
137. Phil Gramm, Op-­Ed., Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A17. 
138. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-­128, 91 Stat. 
1111 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-­2908 (2006)). 
139. Gramm, supra note 137. 
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causing the crLVLV EHFDXVH WKH\ IRU ´SROLWLFDO UHDVRQVµ ZHUH
required to buy bad mortgages taken out by people who could 
not pay.140  Instead, Frank, quoting Bill Black, a professor of 
economics and law at the University of Missouri-­Kansas City, 
DVVLJQV WKH EODPH WR ´IRur entities that under conservative 
economic theory should have exercised effective market 
discipline³the appraisers, the originators of the mortgages, 
the rating agencies, and the investment banking firms that 
packaged the subprime mortgage-­backed securitLHVµ141 
Bill Clinton is number thirteen on Time·V list.142  As 
President, he signed both the repeal of Glass-­Steagall and the 
2000 Commodity Futures Act into law.143  Clinton also loosened 
housing lending rules which had the perverse, unintended side 
effect of creating subprime mortgages.144  Number fourteen, 
*HRUJH:%XVK ´HPEUDFHGGHUHJXODWLRQ DQG DOORZHG IHGHUDO
oversight agencies to ease off of banks and mortgage 
EURNHUVµ145  Number four, Christopher Cox, head of the 
6HFXULWLHV DQG ([FKDQJH &RPPLVVLRQ ´6(&µ, oversaw the 
massive leveraging by banks and failed to rein in the risks 
undertaken by investment banks such as Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch.146  Time believes that 
Cox deserves so much of the blame, that in a subsequent 
edition, it devoted an entire column to his failures, noting that 
KH ZDV D ´FUXFLDO YRLFH >WKDW@ ZDV PLVVLQJµ ´DEVHQWµ D ´QR
VKRZµ DQG ´DVOHHS RQ WKH MREµ³and that was just in the 
DUWLFOH·V ILUVW WKUHH SDUDJUDSKV147  Number two on the list is 
Alan Greenspan, who as head of the Federal Reserve, 
permitted low interest rates to persist for far too long, and 
ZKRVH ´ORQJ-­standing disdain for regulation underpinned the 
PRUWJDJHFULVLVµ148  *UHHQVSDQDOVRDGPLWWHGWR&RQJUHVV´WKDW
 
140. Thomas Frank, Op-­Ed., The Tilting Yard: The GOP Blames the 
Victim, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2008, at A23. 
141. Id. 
142. Gibbs, supra note 4. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Adam Zagorin & Michael Weisskoff, Inside the Breakdown at the 
SEC, TIME, Mar. 9, 2009, at 34. 
148. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20;; see also Floyd Norris, Failing Upward at 
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he made a mistake in presuming that financial firms would 
UHJXODWH WKHPVHOYHVµ149  Finally, former Treasury Secretary 
Hank Paulson appears as number five on the list because he 
responded ´WRRODWHLQEDWWOLQJWKHFULVLVµ150 
It should be noted that Time·VOLVWDOVRLQFOXGHVWKHIRUPHU
head of one federal governmental institution, which it turns 
out should have been regulated much more tightly.  Franklin 
Raines, number nine on Time·s list, became the head of Fannie 
Mae in 1999.151  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, its smaller 
brother, are federally chartered financial institutions, charged 
with providing liquidity to the housing marketplace by 
purchasing mortgages from lenders.152  In effect, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are dominant purchasers, and thereby 
lenders, in the secondary marketplace.  After staggering losses, 
the Federal Government seized both entities in September 
2008.153  Franklin Raines left Fannie Mae in 2004 as the result 
of an accounting scandal, just as it was making massive 
investments in subprime mortgages and securities, both of 
which went south.154  Congressional hearings on the failure of 
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac disclosed that they had 
spent over $175 million in lobbying fees over ten years 
precisely to avoid greater regulation.155  In 2008, Fannie Mae 
had a loss of $58.7 billion, an amounW WKDW ´H[FHHG>HG@ LWVQHW
LQFRPH IRU WKH SUHFHGLQJ  \HDUVµ156  Both Fannie Mae and 
)UHGGLH 0DF DUH H[SHFWHG WR ´JXVK >UHG LQN@ LQ HYHQ ODUJHU
TXDQWLWLHVµ EHFDXVH RI PRUWJDJH GHIDXOWV DQG ORVVHV LQ WKH
 
the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at B1 (providing an in-­depth criticism of 
$ODQ*UHHQVSDQDQGWKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH·VIDLOXUHVZKLFKOHGWRWKHcurrent 
financial crisis). 
149. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20 (internal quotations omitted). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. See Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize 
Lending, U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2008, at A1 (discussing the Bush DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ·VEDLORXWRI)DQQLH0DHDQG
Freddie Mac). 
153. Id. 
154. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20. 
155. Lynnley Browning, Ex-­2IILFHU)DXOWV0RUWJDJH*LDQWVIRU´2UJ\µRI
Nonprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at B3. 
156. James R. Hagerty & Damian Paletta, Red Ink Clouds Role of 
Fannie, Freddie, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at A2. 
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value of their derivative contracts.157  As for Congress, there is 
a saying about those who live in glass houses that comes to 
mind. 
Another regulator·V IDLOXUH to regulate recently came to 
light.  In July 2008, the Treasury seized IndyMac Federal 
%DQN)6% ´,QG\0DFµ LQ WKH WKLUG ODUJHVW EDQN IDLOXUH HYHU
recorded.158  At the time of its failure, IndyMac had $32 billion 
in assets and $19 billion in deposits.159  IndyMac had pursued 
an overly aggressive growth strategy that included failing to 
YHULI\ERUURZHUV·LQFRPHVDQGUHO\LQJRQH[SHQVLYHGHSRVLWVWR
fund its operations.160  7KH 7UHDVXU\ 'HSDUWPHQW·V LQVSHFWRU
JHQHUDO VDLG WKDW WKH 2IILFH RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ ´276µ
ZKLFK ZDV FKDUJHG ZLWK UHJXODWLQJ ,QG\0DF ´GLG QRW WDNH
aggressive action to stop those practices from continuing to 
SUROLIHUDWHµ161  OTS recognized the red flags which had come 
up, but, at the time, did nothing to address them.162 
Economists from the left, the middle and the right agree 
that regulators, particularly Alan Greenspan and the Federal 
Reserve, share the blame for the real estate bubble.163  The 
New York Times TXRWHV *HUDOG 3 2·'ULVFROO -U, of the 
libertarian Cato Institute, DV VD\LQJ ´>WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH@
DOORZHGWKHVHDEVROXWHO\LQVDQHEXEEOHVWRKDSSHQµ164  Charles 
W. Calomiris of the conservative American Enterprise Institute 
VDLG´>w]e do need some regulation-­VPDUWHUUHJXODWLRQµ165  As 
noted previously, Alan S. Blinder of Princeton University has 
written that the people in power made six errors which, had 
they avoided, would have evaded the financial crisis.166  Those 
 
157. Id. 
158. Louise Story, Regulators Seize Mortgage Lender, N.Y. TIMES, July 
12, 2008, at C5. 
159. Reuters, Indy Mac Files for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 2, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/02/business/02lender.html. 
160. Michael R. Crittenden, Regulators Missed Woes at Indy Mac, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at A2. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Abha Bhattarai, Economists Plumb the Depths of the Downturn, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C3. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Blinder, supra note 43. 
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errors have permitWHG ´ZLOG GHULYDWLYHVµ ´VN\-­KLJK OHYHUDJHµ
´DVXESULPHVXUJHµ´ILGGOLQJRQIRUHFORVXUHVµ´OHWWLQJ/HKPDQ
JRµDQGWKH´7$53·VGHWRXUµ167  Robert J. Shiller, a professor 
of economics and finance at <DOH8QLYHUVLW\QRWLQJWKDW´$ODQ
Greenspan . . . acknowledged in a Congressional hearing . . . 
WKDW KH KDG PDGH DQ ¶HUURU· LQ DVVXPLQJ WKDW WKH PDUNHWV
would properly regulate themselves, and . . . that he had no 
LGHDDILQDQFLDOGLVDVWHUZDVLQWKHPDNLQJµZURWHWKDW´ORWVRI
people were worried about the housing boom[, but]. . . the Fed 
GLGQRWWDNHWKHPYHU\VHULRXVO\µ168 
The experts do not spare the SEC either.  Michael Lewis, 
the author of /LDU·V3RNHU,169 and David Einhorn, co-­author of 
Fooling Some of the People All of the Time,170 in discussing the 
rating agencies, wrote WKDW´>R@YHUWKH ODVW\HDUV$PHULFDQ
financial institutions have taken on more and more risk, with 
WKHEOHVVLQJRIUHJXODWRUVµ171  Further, although the SEC 
ZDV´>F@UHDWHGWRSURWHFWLQYHVWRUVIURPILQDQFLal predators, the 
commission has evolved into a mechanism for protecting 
ILQDQFLDO SUHGDWRUV ZLWK SROLWLFDO FORXW IURP LQYHVWLJDWLRQµ172  
Although the New York Times headline says it all³S.E.C. 
Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax Enforcement173³I will 
quote some of the article anyway.  The author stated: 
 
Investor groups had been frozen out by an agency 
dominated by commissioners describing 
themselves as proponents of free-­market 
principles, who made it more difficult for the 
professional staff to bring cases.  Senior jobs lay 
vacant for many months.  Many problems at the 
largest investment houses had gone undetected, 
 
167. Id. 
168. Robert J. Shiller, Challenging the Crowd In Whispers, Not Shouts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at BU5. 
169. LEWIS, supra note 3. 
170. DAVID EINHORN & JOEL GREENBLATT, FOOLING SOME OF THE PEOPLE 
ALL OF THE TIME (2008). 
171. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World As 
We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9. 
172. Id. 
173. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax 
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at B1. 
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and tell tale signs or possible fraud at Bernard L. 
Madoff Securities and at the Stanford Group, 
which was accused last week of being involved in 
an $8 billion investor fraud, were ignored.174 
 
No discussion of the lack of regulation would be complete 
without acknowledging the failure of regulators to curtail one 
of the most pernicious financial inventions that contributed to 
millions of Americans losing their homes³the subprime 
PRUWJDJH  ´6XESULPHµ LV D FDWFKDOO WHUP ZKLFK GHVFULEHV
suspiciously cheap mortgages peddled to the elderly, first-­time 
homebuyers, and to those who were unwilling or unable to read 
the small print.  Adjustable-­rate mortgaJHV ´$50sµ³the 
aforementioned liars loans, ninja loans, and no-­doc loans³fall 
within the subprime category.  Almost all subprime mortgages 
contain an ARM feature.  The mortgages generally carry a low 
teaser interest rate for an initial period.  That rate normally 
UHVHWVRU´H[SORGHVµZLWKLQVL[PRQWKVWRWZR\HDUVWRDPXFK
higher interest rate, which effectively captures the interest and 
profit lost by the lender during the initial period.  Often, when 
the interest rate resets, the monthly mortgage payment can 
increase by up to 50%.175  This can be catastrophic for the 
borrowers whose incomes are generally stretched to meet the 
initial teaser rate payments.176  When subprime mortgages are 
bundled, or packaged, together, and then sliced and diced into 
tranches DQGVHFXULWL]HGWKH\RIWHQEHFRPH´WR[LFZDVWHµZLWK
death coming to all who invest in them.177  In the words of Jack 
Rosenthal, the New York Times columnist, subprime mortgages 
´UHIOHFW WKH GHFHLW F\QLFLVP DQG VFDQGDORXV H[SORLWDWLRQ WKDW
are taking the homes of many thousands, perhaps millions of 
IDPLOLHVµ178 
Why would people buy into a subprime mortgage?  Often, 
they are not told that the mortgage is subprime and carries an 
adjustable rate.  Then, when they find out, the borrowers are 
 
174. Id. 
175. Niall Ferguson, Reasons to Worry, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, § 6 
(Magazine), at 46. 
176. Id. 
177. Rosenthal, supra note 62. 
178. Id. 
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also told that they can refinance into a lower rate mortgage 
when the loan resets.  Of course, if the borrower is a speculator, 
then she assumes that the property secured by the mortgage 
will be sold, and the mortgage paid off, before its interest rate 
resets.  Further, mortgage brokers, who originate 50% of all 
mortgages, have an economic incentive to promote subprime 
mortgages.  Lenders often pay the mortgage brokers a fee, 
FDOOHGD\LHOG VHUYLFHSUHPLXP ´<63µ IRUSODFLQJDERUURZHU
into a subprime mortgage.  YSPs are present in fully 90% of all 
subprime mortgages, implying that brokers needlessly pushed 
their clients into subprime mortgages for the YSP.179  Subprime 
mortgages were not limited to the poor, elderly, or financially 
untutored.  A study conducted by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development shows that one-­in-­nine middle class 
families and one-­in-­fourteen upper middle class families who 
refinanced their mortgages were placed in a subprime loan.180 
The problem for the economy and for many homeowners is 
that when the interest rates on their subprime mortgages 
reset, they could no longer afford their homes.  As a result, they 
either abandoned their homes or lost them through foreclosure.  
*HRUJH3DFNHU·VWULSDORQJ6WDWH5RXWHQHDU7DPSD)ORULGD
and his visiWV WR WKH ´JKRVW VXEGLYLVLRQVµ DORQJ WKH URXWH
vividly illustrates the problem.181  Manny Fernandez wrote an 
investigative report for the New York Times detailing what 
occurred in a four block area in Jamaica, Queens County, 
which had the highest foreclosure rate in New York State.182  
Since 2004, thirty-­nine homes in just that four block area went 
into foreclosure.183  In the past five years, in southeast Queens, 
226 foreclosures have been filed.184  In 2005 alone, 69% of the 
homes purchased in the area were purchased with subprime 
mortgages.185  The foreclosures basically turned what had been 
an evolving middle-­class neighborhood into a depressed area 
 
179. Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation, 
HARV. MAG., May-­June 2008, at 36. 
180. Id. 
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182. Manny Fernandez, Door to Door, Foreclosure Knocks Here, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A33. 
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with renewed drug activity, gangs, over-­grown lots, and 
abandoned or vandalized homes.  In short, people just 
disappeared.186 
For the regulators, the shame is that they knew that the 
subprime debacle was coming well in advance, but they did 
nothing to curtail its detonation.  The real estate bubble is 
generally thought to have burst in the late summer or fall of 
2007.  In June 2006, Niall Ferguson noted: 
 
Since March 2004, there has been a 59 per cent 
increase in one-­year adjustable rate mortgages.  
But that just means that they have become more 
expensive for new borrowers.  The key question 
LV:KHQGRH[LVWLQJ$50·VUHVHW"7KHDQVZHU
Soon.  According to calculations published by 
%DUURQ·VLQ)HEUXDU\RYHUWKHQH[WWZR\HDUVWKH
monthly payments on about $600 billion of 
mortgages taken out by borrowers in the so-­
called subprime market (those with checkered or 
nonexistent credit histories) will increase by as 
much as 50 per cent.  This is because many 
$50·V KDYH WZR-­year teaser periods to entice 
borrowers.  After that, the meaning of adjustable 
becomes painfully apparent.187 
 
We were warned. 
Now, we are being warned that the subprime loans given 
by lenders to borrowers with good credit, Alt-­A loans, are about 
to go bust as well.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have long 
claimed that Alt-­A loans were not subprime mortgages, but a 
VXEVHWRI ´$µPRUWJDJHV188  However, in emails disclosed at a 
congressional hearing, it became apparent that staffers at both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had warned their senior 
executives about risk factors associated with acquiring Alt-­A 
mortgages.189  Despite these warnings, both agencies increased 
 
186. Id. 
187. Ferguson, supra note 175, at 50. 
188. Browning, supra note 155. 
189. Id. 
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their purchases in an ´RUJ\RI MXQNPRUWJDJHGHYHORSPHQWµ190  
Congress was not amused.191 
On the horizon is an increase in the number of defaults on 
another type of mortgage: payment-­option mortgages.  Like 
subprime mortgages, payment-­option mortgages are given with 
an adjustable rate.  They typically carry a low introductory rate 
and give borrowers multiple payment options that may not 
cover the interest due, a practice known as negative 
amortization.192  When the interest rate is recast, borrowers 
can see their monthly payment increase by up to 60%.  
However, unlike subprime mortgages, payment-­option 
mortgages were offered only to borrowers with the best 
credit.193  Therefore, it came as a surprise when FirstFed 
Financial Corp., a major California option mortgage issuer who 
was thought to have pared back on risky lending, reported a 
loss of $70 million in the first quarter of 2008.194  Forty percent 
of its borrowers had become at least thirty days delinquent 
after their option mortgages were recast.195  This was viewed as 
a bad sign, and could be an indication of the next mortgage 
debacle.196 
In summation, it is appropriate to quote Professor 
Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Law School, who in her article, 
Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation, wrote that due 
WR JRYHUQPHQWDO UHJXODWLRQ ´>L@W LV LPSRVVLEOH >LQ WKH 8QLWHG
States] to buy a toaster that has a one-­in-­five chance of 
EXUVWLQJ LQWR IODPHV DQG EXUQLQJ GRZQ \RXU KRXVHµ EXW
´LQQRYDWLRQ LQ ILQDQFLDO products has produced 
incomprehensible terms and sharp practices that have left 
IDPLOLHV DW WKHPHUF\RI WKRVHZKRZULWH WKH FRQWUDFWVµ197  It 
should be noted that Professor Warren, who is the head of the 
Congressional Oversight Panel evaluating the effectiveness of 
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the TARP payments to banks, has come under criticism from 
conservatives for her views about debtor responsibility for the 
financial crisis.198 
The evidence is in.  From across the spectrum, it would be 
very hard indeed to find someone who does not concur that the 
lack of appropriate governmental regulation added to the air 
within an expanding real estate bubble.  The question now is 
whether they have learned enough from the mistakes of the 
past to lead us into a new age of American capitalism where all 
are protected from the most harmful, solely short-­term, and 
purely self-­interested, aspects of the free marketplace.  After 
all, even Alan Greenspan has conceded that the marketplace 
does a pretty poor job of regulating itself.199  After a twenty-­
year vacation, it is time for regulators to return to work. 
 
VII. Consumerism 
 
$V :DOW .HOO\ IDPRXVO\ SRLQWHG RXW ´:H KDYH PHW WKH
HQHP\DQGKHLVXVµ200 
We have already discussed how consumerism³the 
obsession to buy more and bigger things, from toys to 
electronics to vacation homes³through the use of the home 
equity ATM machine, contributed to the creation of the real 
estate bubble and its eventual bursting.201  The Darwinian 
question subject to debate is which came first: consumerism, 
the propensity to buy things on credit, or the bubble?  Jackson 
Lears, the author of Something for Nothing, Luck in America, 
says that the answer is the former³debt-­financed 
consumerism came first.202  In his article, The American Way of 
Debt: We Moralize About It. Then We Borrow, Lear discussed 
the history of consumer debt in America.203  Noting that 
´$PHULFDQV DUH DZDVK LQ UHG LQN FRQVXPHU LQGHEWHGQHVV LV
 
198. Susan Schmidt, Policing TARP Proves Tricky, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 
2009, at A4. 
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soaring, the savings rate is down to zero and people are filing 
IRUEDQNUXSWF\DWUHFRUGUDWHVµKHVDLG 
 
[t]he equation of debt and decline assumes that 
once upon a time Americans lived within their 
means and saved for what they bought.  This is 
fantasy: there never was a golden age of thrift.  
Debt has always played an important role in 
$PHULFDQV· OLYHV -­ not merely as a means of 
instant gratification but also as a strategy for 
survival and tool for economic advance.204 
 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that American 
consumers were number five on Time PDJD]LQH·V OLVW RI WKH
twenty-­five people to blame for the financial crisis.205  We were 
charged with living beyond our means through borrowing.206  
Time QRWHG WKDW ´>K@RXVHKROG GHEW LQ WKH86    ]RRPHG WR
PRUHWKDQRILQFRPHLQXSIURPLQµ207 
The operative image of the American consumer over the 
last five years or so has been one of a family borrowing against 
the rising equity in its home, in effect turning its home into an 
ATM machine to purchase more and more.  The examples are 
legion.  George Packer introduces us to Jennifer and Ron 
Formosa.208  She worked as a bank clerk and he worked in 
construction.  Using a $110,000 mortgage, they built a three 
family home in Cape Coral, Florida.209  ´>7@KH\UHILQDQFHGZLWK
Washington Mutual [and] took out an HTXLW\ OLQHµ LQRUGHU WR
pay their bills.210  The value of their house rose to $280,000.211  
They continued to borrow and used the proceeds to put in a 
patio, pay off the cars, and to buy a boat;; and then there were 
the vacations, cruises, going to Orlando, taking the kids to 
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Disney³just being Americans.212  Then, Ron lost his job when 
the construction industry imploded in Florida.213  The loss of 
their home came next.214  The Formosa family thus became one 
of the 24,000 families on the foreclosure docket in Lee County 
that year.215 
Even when families act conservatively, they can be trapped 
in their homes when the rock of their debt meets the hard place 
RI WKHLU KRPH·V GHFUHDVLQJ YDOXH  7KH Wall Street Journal 
recently focused on the effects of the collapse of real estate 
prices in Maricopa, Arizona.216  Maricopa, which is located near 
Phoenix, grew from a population of 1,400 a decade ago to 
37,000 in 2008.217  7KH&DPSEHOO·VZHUH D W\SLFDO IDPLO\ZKR
moved into the area in 2005 when Mr. Campbell accepted a job 
transfer from San Diego to Phoenix.218  ´7KH\VFUDSHGWRJHWKHU
a $50,000 down payment to buy a new four-­bedroom home in 
0DULFRSD IRU µ219  Today, because of overbuilding 
caused by easy money in the past, Ms. Campbell believes the 
house is worth half as much, and that may even be 
optimistic.220  7KHGHYHORSHUZKREXLOWWKH&DPSEHOO·V·KRPHLV
RIIHULQJ VLPLODU KRPHV LQ WKH VDPH VXEGLYLVLRQ ´IURP
.µ221  Zillow.com says that 75% of the homeowners in the 
area owe more on their mortgages than their homes are 
worth.222  7KRVHLQGLYLGXDOVOLNHWKH&DPSEHOO·VDUHWUDSSHGLQ
their homes and cannot move unless they are willing to take a 
substantial loss.  Yet, with a 20% down payment, they did 
nothing wrong. 
In June 2006, before the real estate bubble burst in 2007, 
the New York Times devoted an entire Sunday magazine to 
American debt.  Future historians, in their attempt to 
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understand how the current recession got started, will most 
certainly be reading this prescient edition of the New York 
Times for clues.  For our purposes, two quotes will be sufficient.  
Niall Ferguson, a professor of history at Harvard wrote: 
 
In the past five years alone, the value of U.S. 
home-­mortgage debt has increased by nearly $3 
trillion.  Not all of that borrowing went to pay for 
real estate, the traditional function of mortgages.  
In 2004, net mortgage borrowing not used for the 
purchase of new homes amounted to nearly $600 
billion.  The International Monetary Fund 
estimates that this kind of equity extraction has 
risen from less than 2 percent of household 
disposable income in the year 2000 to more than 
9 percent in the third quarter of last year.223 
 
Additionally, Jackson Lears explained: 
 
The upward spiral of earning and spending 
VXUYLYHG XQWLO WKH ·VZKHQ WKHPLGcentury 
ideal of corporate citizenship evaporated in the 
harsher climate of renewed international 
competition.  Fearing foreign rivals, American 
business ended its implicit social contract with 
unions by seeking cheap labor in overseas 
markets. During the ·V ZKLOH UHDO LQFRPH
continued to stagnate for most Americans, the 
ascendancy of Ronald Reagan gave government 
sanction to unprecedented consumer spending.  
5HDJDQ·V UKHWRULFDO UHIXVDO RI OLPLWV FRPELQHG
with the deregulation of the lending industry to 
detach dreams of luxury from previous 
constraints.  As money worship mounted, job 
security disappeared and inequalities widened, 
pundits spoke of a new Gilded Age.  By the 
·VEORDWHGLFRQVRIDIIOXHQFHSUROLIHUDWHGWKH
gargantuan pseudo-­military vehicle, the 10,000-­
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40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18
220 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:180 
 
square foot hacienda.  A bigger standard package 
of household goods demanded deeper debt and 
accelerated the pace of the consumer treadmill.  
No one ZDQWHGWRORRNOLNHD´ORVHUµ224 
 
Even former Senator Phil Gramm, deflecting the blame for 
the financial crisis from himself to everyone else, wrote in an 
Op-­Ed piece for the Wall Street Journal: 
 
7KH)HG·VVKDUSSURORQJHGUHGXFWLRQLQLQWHUHVW
rates stimulated a housing market that was 
already booming -­ triggering six years of double-­
digit increases in housing prices during a period 
when the general inflation rate was low.  Buyers 
ERXJKW KRXVHV WKH\ FRXOGQ·W DIIRUG EHOLHYLQJ
they could refinance in the future and benefit 
from the ongoing appreciation.  Lenders assumed 
that even if everything else went wrong, 
properties could still be sold for more than they 
cost and the loans could be repaid.  This 
mentality permeated the market from the 
originator to the holder of securitized mortgages, 
from the rating agency to the financial 
regulator.225 
 
Then, in the fall of 2007, shortly after the beginning of the 
credit crisis in May 2007, the real estate bubble burst and 
consumers stopped buying.  Soon thereafter, major retailers 
VXFK DV /LQHQV ¶Q 7KLQJV 6KDUSHU ,PDJH 0HUY\Q·V &LUFXLW
City, Steve & Barr\·V )RUWXQRII·V DQGPDQ\ RWKHUV EHJDQ WR
file for Chapter 11 under the Bankruptcy Code.226  ´7KH
new commercial bankruptcy filings in May [2008] also 
 
224. Lears, supra note 202, at 15. 
225. Gramm, supra note 137. 
226. See, e.g., Retailers and Bankruptcy, DEAL.COM, June 2, 2009, 
http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/dealwatch/retailers-­and-­bankruptcy.php 
GLVFXVVLQJ ´VRPH RI 7KH'HDO
V UHWDLO EDQNUXSWF\ FRYHUDJH DQG >DQDO\]LQJ@
what might be in store for some not yet bankrupt but possibly teetering 
[retailers]µ 
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UHSUHVHQWHG D  LQFUHDVH IURP0D\     µ227  On the 
consumer side, the New York Times reported that: 
 
[b]y the end of 2008, slightly more than 9 percent 
of all mortgages in the United States were either 
delinquent or in foreclosure, according to the 
Mortgage Bankers Association.  The number of 
loans in foreclosure hit a new record of 2.3 
million last year, more than double the volume in 
2006, and industry analysts estimate that it will 
hit at least 3 million in 2009 in the absence of a 
government rescue.228 
 
By February 2009, the financial uncertainty had driven 
consumer spending off the proverbial cliff.  The malaise and 
lack of spending even reached the style pages of the 
newspapers.  Restaurant and store openings, which only last 
season were lavish affairs, were suddenly becoming less 
spectacular, even when owners tried to make them fabulous.  
Club kids, the harbingers of new styles, are beginning to lose 
cachet to³you may gasp here³Barbie.229  In the face of the 
grim economy, Kenny Kenny, club kid and style maven, 
admitted WKDW ´>W@KH RQO\ ZD\ \RX FDQ SRVVLEO\ PDNH LW
through, darling, is to face reality . . . . Fabulousness only goes 
VRIDUµ230 
Fashion Week in New York, universally known for its 
celebrity sightings, over-­the-­top displays, and excess, was 
´LQYDGHGLQVWHDGE\DSDOSDEOHJULPQHVVWKLV\HDUµ231  ´>6@RPH
were taken aback by just how somber the mood hanging over 
the crowds at Fashion Week was;; several of the most devoted 
fashionistas said that even they were thrown into a bit of an 
H[LVWHQWLDO FULVLVµ232  A Wall Street hedge fund manager who 
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was a guest at one of the shows epitomized it all.  At the end of 
the show, he pulled his Blackberry from his cashmere coat 
pocket, which by the way was missing a button, checked the 
stock market and groaned ´,·P ZDWFKLQJ WKH ZKROH WKLQJ
PHOWLQJGRZQµ233 
Even the purveyors of luxury goods, who many thought 
would withstand the crisis, began to experience financial pain 
and even started to lay off workers.  Some in the industry were 
beginning to wonder whether a prolonged slump in consumer 
spending could result in an eternal backlash against 
conspicuous consumption.234  Maybe we should all begin to 
worry.  Given the fact that the economy depends upon 
FRQVXPHUVSHQGLQJIRUJURZWKWKHZRUGVRIWKH)RUPRVD·VZKR
ZHPHWHDUOLHUVKRXOGJLYHXVVRPHSDXVH´,·OOVDYHP\PRQH\
instead of spend it . . . .  ,GRQ·W WKLQN,·OOHYHUZDQWWREX\D
KRXVHDJDLQµ235 
As former Senator Gramm conceded, consumer spending 
based on consumer borrowing was a significant factor in 
creating the real estate bubble.236  It would be ironic if the slide 
in spending³the basis of the American marketplace³caused 
by the bursting of the real estate bubble, had the perverse 
effect of endangering the very core of American capitalism.  
Given our societal history of debt, perhaps we need not worry.  
However, the Japanese experience offers a caveat.  From the 
1990s through about 2000, the Japanese went through such a 
severe HFRQRPLFPDODLVHWKDWWKHSHULRGZDVGXEEHG´7KH/RVW
'HFDGHµ237  ´6WXQWHG ZDJHV DQG GHSUHVVHG VWRFN SULFHV   
turn[ed] [the] once free-­VSHQGLQJ >-DSDQHVH@ FRQVXPHU LQWRµD
careful and constant saver.238  Even after their economy 
recovered, fueled in part by an export boom to the United 
States and China, many Japanese have continued to save.239  
Their unwillingness to spend produced a significant drag on 
 
233. Id. 
234. Sellers Confront Lapse of Luxury, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at 
C10. 
235. Packer, supra note 111. 
236. Gramm, supra note 137. 
237. Hiroko Tabuchi, When Consumers Cut Back: An Object Lesson From 
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A1. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
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the Japanese economy.  Rampant consumption is frowned upon 
and many people now want to live the simple life.  As a result, 
WKH-DSDQHVHHFRQRP\LVLQ´IUHH-­fall because it cannot rely on 
domestic conVXPSWLRQ WR SLFN XS WKH VODFNµ240  Japanese 
consumers felt compelled to save more in case they lost their 
jobs, thus creating a vicious deflationary cycle.241  Could the 
same happen here in the United States? 
Consumer spending, fueled by an unprecedented increase 
in the value of American homes and the belief that home prices 
would never go down, certainly contributed to the perpetuation 
of the real estate bubble.  When the bubble burst, and home 
prices actually started to go down, credit dried up.  Consumers 
stopped spending, businesses dependent on that spending 
began to go under, and consumers began to spend even less.  
More businesses, therefore, went out of business, more 
consumers lost their livelihoods³you see where this is going.  
The tea leaves are not good.  In the fourth quarter of 2008, the 
$PHULFDQ´JURVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFWIHOODWDQDnnualized rate of 
6.2 percent, the steepest decline since the 1982 recession . . .µ242  
7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 0LFKLJDQ UHSRUWHG ´DQ LQGH[ RI FRQVXPHU
confidence fell for the first time in three months, to 56.3, from 
 LQ -DQXDU\ >@µ243  After years of unbridled 
consumption, American consumers are petrified.  We cannot 
put this recession behind us until we start to spend again.  This 
is the irony of ironies.  Consumer spending based upon 
consumer borrowing helped to create the real estate bubble, the 
bursting of which led to our current financial recession.  Now, 
to restart the economy, consumers have to start spending and 
borrowing again, but, as discussed above, lenders, because of 
losses resulting from profligate lending during the boom years, 
do not currently have the capital to lend.244  ´9LFLRXVµPD\EH
the entirely proper word to describe the economic cycle in 
which we now find ourselves. 
 
240. Id. ´,QWKH ODVWWKUHHPRQWKVRI-DSDQ·VHFRQRP\VKUDQNDW
DQDQQXDOL]HGUDWHRISHUFHQWµ 
241. See id. 
242. Catherine Rampell, G.D.P. Revision Suggests Long, Steeper 
Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at B3. 
243. Id. 
244. See discussion supra Part IV. 
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I began this section with a quote from Jackson Lears: 
´'HEWKDVDOZD\VSOD\HGDQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQ$PHULFDQV·OLYHV
² not merely as a means of instant gratification but also as a 
VWUDWHJ\IRUVXUYLYDODQGDWRROIRUHFRQRPLFDGYDQFHµ245  And, 
for the sake of the global economy, I think we all should hope 
that Mr. Lears is correct. 
 
VIII. Mortgage Fraud 
 
Professor Elizabeth Warren quoted experts as estimating 
WKDW ´IUDXGDQGGHFHSWLRQ VWULSSHGELOOLRQ LQHTXLW\ IURP
homeowners, particularly from elderly and working-­class 
IDPLOLHVHYHQEHIRUHWKHVXESULPHFULVLVJRWLQWRIXOOVZLQJµ246  
´>/@HQGHUV>ZHUHH[SHFWHG@WRLQFXU about $2.5 billion in losses 
DVDUHVXOWRIPRUWJDJHIUDXGLQµ247  The Mortgage Asset 
5HVHDUFK ,QVWLWXWH ´0$5,µ LQ LWV 4XDUWHUO\ )UDXG 5HSRUW
dated December 2, 2008, reported that during the second 
quarter of 2008, the number of incidents of fraud and verified 
misrepresentations submitted by mortgage industry 
participants increased by 45% over the same period in 2007.248  
According to MARI, the FBI investigates mortgage fraud in two 
GLVWLQFW DUHDV ´IUDXG IRU SURILWµ DQG ´IUDXG IRU SURSHUW\µ249  
Fraud for property covers individuals who misstate their 
income or assets in order to qualify for a mortgage.250  Fraud 
for profit involves industry insiders, such as appraisers, 
brokers, title personnel, and lenders, who conspire to obtain 
mortgages.251  Committing fraud for housing is an illegal 
action, which is perpetrated solely by borrowers.252  Fully 80% 
 
245. Lears, supra note 202, at 13. 
246. Warren, supra note 179, at 37. 
247. Bob Tedeschi, The Widening Web of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2008, at RE10 (citing a report produced by the financial consultant firm 
TowerGroup, Needham, Mass.). 
248. MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST., MARI QUARTERLY FRAUD REPORT 
2 (2008) [hereinafter MARI 2008 REPORT], available at 
http://www.marisolutions.com/pdfs/mba/mortgage-­fraud-­report-­2008Q2.pdf. 
249. MARI, Understanding Mortgage Fraud, 
http://www.marisolutions.com/mortgage-­fraud.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 
2009). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. See id. 
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of all reported fraud losses involve collaboration or collusion by 
industry insiders, basically fraud for profit.253  The types of 
fraud for profit include equity skimming, property flipping, and 
mortgage-­related identity theft.254 
Equity skimming, or as it is better known in New York, 
KRPH HTXLW\ WKHIW DOVR NQRZQ DV ´GHHG WKHIWµ RU ´IRUHFORVXUH
UHVFXHµ starts with a homeowner, usually elderly, who is 
facing, or is in, foreclosure.255  The mortgage, which is in 
foreclosure, is usually in an amount that is only a small 
IUDFWLRQRI WKHYDOXHRI WKHSURSHUW\ $WKLUGSDUW\´LQYHVWRUµ
approaches the homeowner in foreclosure and offers to save the 
homeowner from foreclosure.  To do this, the investor requires 
that the homeowner, sometimes with disclosure, but more often 
without, convey the mortgaged property to the investor.  The 
investor promises to return the property to the homeowner 
once that person meets an easy payment plan.  Of course, the 
homeowner in foreclosure can never meet the terms of the plan.  
Often, the homeowner never realizes, or is never told, that he 
or she has conveyed the property to the investor.  Using the 
deed, the investor obtains a new mortgage based upon the real 
or inflated value of the property.  The new mortgage goes into 
foreclosure often without the knowledge of the original 
KRPHRZQHU ZKR WKH LQYHVWRU RQO\ PRQWKV EHIRUH ´UHVFXHGµ
from foreclosure. 
Over the past few years, such home equity thefts from the 
elderly became epidemic in areas of New York City that were 
experiencing gentrification and rapid increasing property 
valuations.  Recently, the Wall Street Journal reported on the 
case of Daphne and William Webb, an elderly couple in 
Montclair, New Jersey, who found themselves the victims of a 
´IRUHFORVXUHUHVFXHµVFKHPH256  After suffering a heart attack, 
Mrs. Webb left her job.257  The couple soon fell behind on their 
 
253. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Operation Quick Flip Stats, 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec05/chartsandgraphs.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 
2009). 
254. MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248. 
255. Philip Shiskin, :KHQ¶5HVFXH·0HDQV(YLFWLRQ, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 
2009, at D1. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
46https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18
226 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:180 
 
mortgage and their lender started a foreclosure action.258  Two 
investors5RQDOG/RVQHUDQG$O\VVD$]UDQFDPHWRWKH:HEE·V
rescue with a sale-­leaseback offer.259  7KH :HEE·V VROG WKHLU
home to Ms. Azan for $820,000 in March 2006, but they 
received no cash from the sale.260  They signed a $2,600 a 
month lease which provided that they could buy their house 
back for $45,000 after paying rent for eighteen months.261  
Already, the math does not add up.  Ms. Azran obtained a 
$533,000 mortgage from Credit Suisse, even though she had 
allegedly admitted on her loan application to not having a job 
and only having $100 in assets.262  Ms. Azran fell behind on her 
mortgage payments (surprise) and Wells Fargo, the loan 
servicer for Credit Suisse, commenced a foreclosure action 
against Azran.263  7KH:HEE·VKDYHEURXJKWDQDFWLRQDJDLQVW
Losner, Azran, and Credit Suisse for fraud, claiming that they 
did not understand the documents that they were asked to 
sign.264  They assert that Losner, a disbarred attorney, and 
Azran cheated them out of $400,000 in equity that they had in 
their home.265 
A New Jersey court has stayed the foreclosure action and 
WKH :HEE·V DUH SD\LQJ WKHLU UHQW LQWR DQ HVFURZ DFFRXQW266  
8QGRXEWHGO\ DQ LQYHVWPHQW EDQN SDFNDJHG0V $]UDQ·V QRZ
non-­performing mortgage into a CDO or CMO that is probably 
underwater itself.  If one multiplies this mortgage by those 
taken out by thousands of other homeowners whose stories are 
OLNH WKRVH RI WKH :HEE·V RU WKH )RUPRVD·V ZH FDQ VHH KRZ
mortgage-­backed securities became so toxic.  The underlying 
mortgages are either not being paid, or their values have 
decreased because of decreasing demand for the houses that 
have been pledged as security for the loans. 
In order to prevent the type of home equity theft that the 
:HEE·V DOOHJHG KDSSHQHG WR WKHP WKH 1HZ <RUN State 
 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
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Legislature adopted, and the Governor signed, the Home 
Equity Theft Prevention Act, which took effect on February 1, 
2007.267  Under the Act, a person deprived of their home equity 
had two years to rescind the transaction that led to the loss of 
their equity.268  In addition, the Act imposed substantial 
criminal and civil penalties upon participants in an equity 
skimming transaction.269  The Act imposes much of the burden 
of determining which schemes came under its purview to title 
underwriters, who would have to bear the cost of claims.270  
Because suspect transactions became uninsurable, home equity 
theft, after February 1, 2007, no longer took up space on the 
front pages.  Also, much of the public DQG ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW·V
attention turned to the problems caused by subprime 
lending.271 
According to MARI, Florida had the most reported 
incidents of mortgage fraud in the second quarter of 2008.272  
George Packer gives an example of the second type of fraud, 
property flipping, in his article, The Ponzi State: 
 
Karen Johnson-­Crowther, another real estate 
agent in Fort Myers, showed me the sales history 
of a property in an upscale gated community 
which she had recently bought at a foreclosure 
auction.  Building had begun in 2005.  On 
December 29, 2005, the house sold for $399,600.  
On December 30, 2005, it sold for $589,000.  On 
June 25, 2008, it was foreclosed on.  Johnson-­
 
267. Home Equity Theft Prevention Act, 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 308 
(McKinney).  The Act, codified as Chapter 308 of the Laws of 2006, amended 
paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) of, and added a new paragraph (h) to, Section 595-­a 
of the Banking Law, added new Section 265(a) to the Real Property Law and 
added Section 1303 to the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. § 3.  See also Michael J. Berey, Home Equity Theft Prevention 
Act Took Effect Feb. 1, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 2007, at 4 (providing a detailed 
analysis of the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act);; Marvin N. Bagwell, Home 
(TXLW\7KHIW3UHYHQWLRQ$FW7KH7LWOH&RPSDQ\·V3HUVSHFWLYH, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 
13, 2007, at S6 (discussing land title trends). 
270. MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248. 
271. Marvin N. Bagwell, Home Equity Theft Prevention Act: Subprime 
Crisis May Be Masking Effects of Statute, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 2008, at 5. 
272. MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248, at 2. 
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Crowther bought it in December for $325,000.  I 
said that the one day increase in value must 
have been some kind of record, and she looked at 
PHSLW\LQJO\´1Rµ273 
 
Alex Sink, the State Treasurer tROG3DFNHUSRLQWEODQN´7KDW·V
DIUDXGXOHQWWUDQVDFWLRQµ274 
+HUHLVDQRWKHUH[DPSOHLQ0U3DFNHU·VZRUGV 
 
Last fall, Michael Van Sickler, of the St. 
Petersburg Times, tracked the real-­estate deals of 
a local tattoo-­parlor owner named Sang-­Min 
Kim, also known as Sonny.  Starting in 2004, 
Sonny Kim made ninety sales around Tampa, 
mostly in poor neighborhoods, on which he 
cleared four million dollars.  Van Sickler found 
WKDWPDQ\RI.LP·VEX\HUVZKRSXW OLWWOH RUQR
money down were, untraceable, some had been 
convicted of drug dealing and other crimes.  Kim, 
who has not been charged with any crimes and 
could not be reached for this article, closed a 
third of his deals with a title agent named 
Howard Gaines, who now faces up to forty-­five 
years in prison on a fraud conviction elsewhere 
in Florida.  According to law enforcement 
experts, drug dealers often become flippers, in 
order to launder money. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . .LP·V GHDOV KDG EHHQ ILQDQFHG E\
Wachovia, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, 
Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.275 
 
Illinois ranked third in reported incidents of mortgage 
fraud according to MARI.276  Susan Chandler of the Chicago 
 
273. Packer, supra note 111, at 84. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 84-­85. 
276. MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248, at 2. 
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Tribune wrote a series of investigative articles describing a 
fraud that³except for a dead body in a red tracksuit³was very 
similar to the one in Florida, described above.277  In Illinois, as 
in Florida, a realtor, mortgage broker, title agent, and straw 
buyer consSLUHG WRVWHDOSURSHUW\ IURPWKHGHFHDVHG·VPRWKHU
who was also deceased.278  The Chicago case attracted national 
attention in the real property bar because the title underwriter, 
Ticor Title, denied the title claim made by the lender, 
Countrywide, because RI &RXQWU\ZLGH·V JURVV QHJOLJHQFH LQ
funding the loan.279  Ticor asserted that &RXQWU\ZLGH·VDFWLRQV
FDPHXQGHUWKHSROLF\·V´DFWVRIWKHLQVXUHG·VµH[FOXVLRQ280  The 
point is made.  I will pass on discussing cases from the state 
that is ranked number two, California.  You can just imagine. 
The third type of mortgage fraud, identity theft, used to be 
so simple.  Title people of a certain age might remember the 
first time that a borrower showed up at a mortgage closing 
with a woman who he claimed was his wife, but who later 
turned out to be his girlfriend.  Then, equal opportunity 
arrived, and with it, equal opportunity fraud;; the wife brought 
her boyfriend to the closing.  What is good for the goose is good 
for the gander.  Title companies reacted by requiring photo 
identification at the closing.  The crooks then began to 
PDQXIDFWXUH IDNH GULYHUV· OLFHQVHV  1RZ ZLWK WKH DLG RI
FRPSXWHUV DQG ´GXPSVWHU GLYLQJµ WKRVH LQWHQW XSRQ
FRPPLWWLQJ IUDXG ZLOO VWHDO D SHUVRQ·V HQWLUH LGHQWLW\  7KH
victim may not find out that she even purchased the property 
until she receives a foreclosure notice in the mail.  Such claims 
are ruinous for everyone concerned³from lender to title 
company to victim.281  No one profits except the person or 
persons who perpetuated the fraud. 
 
277. Susan Chandler, This House was a Steal, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2008, 
at 1. 
278. Id.;; Susan Chandler, Title Firm Ready to do Battle, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 
17, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter Chandler, Battle]. 
279. Chandler, Battle, supra note 278. 
280. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 2008-­CH-­25938 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed July 18, 
2008), 2008 WL 3991700.  See also Marvin N. Bagwell, Obligation Contested: 
,QVXUHU·V6XLW&RXOG+DYH1DWLRQDO,PSOLFDWLRQV, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 2008, at 5;; 
Chandler, Battle, supra note 278. 
281. See generally Marvin N. Bagwell, Identity Theft Fraud Is Alive and 
Well, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at S5. 
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When identity theft is added to equity skimming or 
flipping, the damages can be huge.  The New York Times 
reported that federal prosecutors recently indicted four 
individuals who conspired to obtain $10 million in mortgage 
loans, using persons living in a halfway house and public 
housing as homebuyers.282  It appears that flipping, with the 
aid of appraisers and a bank employee, may have been 
involved.283  When the mortgage fraud also involves investors, 
that is, when people provide a lender with funds to make 
mortgages, the losses can take years to resolve and ruin lives.  
It took a decade, but authorities are now holding Wayne Puff in 
jail for orchestrating a Ponzi scheme on top of a mortgage fraud 
that may cost New Jersey investors $55 million.284 
It should be clear from the above discussion on 
securitization that mortgage lenders deserve part of the blame 
for the real estate bubble.285  Including Angelo Mozilo of 
Countrywide at number one, eleven bankers also appear on 
Time PDJD]LQH·VOLVW-RH&DVVDQRRI$,*DWnumber seven;; 
(2) Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers at number eleven;; (3) Marion 
and Herb Sandler of World Savings Bank at number twelve;; (4) 
6WDQ 2·1HDO RI 0HUULOO /\QFK DW QXPEHU ILIWHHQ  -RKQ
Devaney, a hedge fund purchaser of option ARMs, at number 
eighteen;; (6) Lew Ranieri of Salomon Brothers, who invented 
mortgage pooling, at number twenty;; (7) Fred Goodwin of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland at number twenty-­two;; (8) Sandy Weill 
of Citigroup at number twenty-­three;; and (9) Jimmy Cayne of 
Bear Stearns at number twenty-­five.286 
Not only did these mortgage lenders and buyers create, sell 
and buy mortgage securities that resulted in devastating losses 
throughout the financial markets nationwide at the retail level, 
but their shoddy underwriting permitted fraud to occur.  For 
H[DPSOH WKH2QWDULR7HDFKHUV·3HQVLRQ3ODQ%RDUG LQDVXLW
ILOHG DJDLQVW :DVKLQJWRQ 0XWXDO %DQN ´:D0Xµ ZKLFK LQ
 
282. Benjamin Weiser, 4 Indicted in $10 Million Subprime Mortgage 
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A28. 
283. Id. 
284. Russ Buettner, )LUVW,QYHVWRUV·5HDO(VWDWH%RRPDQG1RZD%XVW, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at LI8. 
285. See discussion supra Part III. 
286. Gibbs, supra note 4. 
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order to prevent its collapse, the Federal Government arranged 
for it to be taken over by JPMorgan Chase), complained that it 
was all about the number of loans and not the quality.287  The 
HPSOR\HHV ZHUH LQVWUXFWHG WR DSSURYH ORDQV ´QR PDWWHU
ZKDWµ288  ´7KH\ GLGQ·W FDUH LIZHZHUH JLYLQJ ORDQV WR SHRSOH
WKDW GLGQ·W TXDOLI\  ,QVWHDG LW ZDV KRZPDQ\ ORDQV GLG \RX
guys close and fuQG"µ289  Proper documentation or not, the 
securitization machine had to be fed. 
As noted above, mortgage fraud has numerous 
permutations.  We are probably not aware of all of them, and 
most certainly, new ones are being perpetuated and invented 
every day.  IQDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ´:K\GR\RXUREEDQNV"µ, 
Willie Sutton is reputed WRKDYH UHVSRQGHG ´>E@HFDXVH WKDW LV
ZKHUHWKHPRQH\LVµ290  When it comes to mortgage fraud, the 
same holds true, except that instead of one, or even a dozen 
banks being the victim, this time it was an entire global 
financial system.  Although we may never know the amount, 
there can be no doubt that mortgage fraud was a major 
contributor to the inflation of the real estate bubble and to its 
eventual bursting. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
People working in the title industry have been greatly 
affected by the bursting of the real estate bubble.  Major 
XQGHUZULWHUV &RPPRQZHDOWK DQG /DZ\HUV· 7LWOH QRZ KDYH
new corporate owners.  Hundreds of title offices have been 
closed.  Many companies, especially on the West Coast, have 
entered bankruptcy.  Hundreds of employees in New York, and 
thousands across the nation have been laid off.  Despite the 
suffering, many people in the industry question whether we 
could have done anything to prevent the real estate bubble 
from being created and from bursting.  After all, we attended 
the closings and saw many transactions where we knew that 
 
287. Gretchen Morgenson, :DV7KHUHD/RDQ,W'LGQ·W/LNH", N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2008, at BU1. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. See Albin Krebs, Willie Sutton is Dead at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
1980, at A31. 
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the borrower could not pay the mortgage and had no idea what 
a subprime, adjustable rate, or negative amortization meant.  
We often predicted, with some accuracy, that the borrower 
would default, and that in ninety, maybe 120, days, we would 
be running a foreclosure search on the same property.  Perhaps 
we could have prevented a closing every now and then, but the 
purpose of this over-­lengthy Article was to show that it would 
KDYH EHHQ DNLQ WR RQHSHUVRQ·V SXWWLQJ KLV RU KHU ILQJHU LQ D
dike that surrounded not only Wall Street, but also London, 
Dublin, Beijing, Tokyo, Taiwan, Paris, Sydney, Rihayd, Dubai, 
Singapore, Caracas, Mexico City, Toronto³anywhere money 
was to be made. 
Quite frankly, the financial forces arrayed against anyone 
trying to stop the flood would have made deterrence impossible.  
Title people need not feel guilty.  Nobody can live without air.  
The forces of securitization, globalization, lack of regulation, 
speculation, consumerism, and mortgage fraud would have 
conspired to render any Cassandra voiceless and impotent.  
The only saving grace is that we have the opportunity to learn 
from the current crisis so that we do not repeat our borrowing 
and investment errors.  The next time, and there will be a next 
time, we will not make the same mistake.  The next bubble will 
not involve real estate.  After all, no one really speculates 
obscenely on the price of tulips anymore.  Or do they? 
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